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Abstract
The 2002 Farm Bill included a provision requiring various agricultural
commodities to comply with country of origin labeling (COOL). Proponents of COOL
argued that the policy would support U.S. producers and benefit U.S. consumers. This
argument was based on the assumption that U.S. consumers prefer domestic products to
imported products and hence the demand for U.S. products would increase following the
implementation of COOL. However, analyzing the impact of COOL on shrimp, one of
the first commodities covered the program, is complicated by recent trade disputes,
concerns over the safety of farm raised products and potential stigma effects associated
with the 2010 Gulf Coast BP oil spill.
Shrimp is produced by two methods: Fresh-catch shrimp are harvested directly
from the ocean, while farm-raised shrimp are produced in managed ponds. Both
processes have benefits and detriments that influence consumers’ preferences.
Furthermore, most shrimp produced in the United States is produced by the fresh catch
process, while most imported shrimp is farm raised. Thus, disentangling the effects of
country of origin labeling on demand is complicated by consumers’ preferences for a
particular production process.
Analyzing consumers’ preferences for shrimp is further complicated by the recent
oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. On April 20, 2010, a Deepwater Horizon oil rig had an
explosion and caught fire, causing oil to leak into the Gulf of Mexico for three months.
In addition, other attributes of shrimp, such as size, appearance, smell, and taste,
influence consumers’ preferences for a specific type of shrimp. An experiment using the
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Becker-DeGroot-Marschack mechanism is conducted to analyze how attributes,
production processes, and stigma affect willingness to pay.
The experimental results indicate that shrimp derived from the Gulf of Mexico are
stigmatized. In addition, participants preferred domestic to imported shrimp and fresh
caught to farm raised shrimp. There was no evidence that participants preferred local
shrimp.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Country of origin labeling was first introduced in the 2002 Farm Bill. This new
regulation, commonly known as COOL, required covered commodities to be labeled with
country of origin information. Covered commodities included muscle cuts of beef, lamb
and pork, ground beef, ground lamb, ground pork, fish and shellfish, items referred to as
perishable agriculture commodities (fresh and frozen fruits and vegetables), and peanuts.
COOL was slated to go into effect in 2004 but implementation was delayed (Agricultural
Marketing Service, 2008). Fish and shellfish were the first products to have to comply
with implementation occurring on April 4, 2005 (AMS, 2008). By the time COOL was
fully implemented three years later, the list of covered commodities had grown to include
chicken, goat, ground chicken, ground goat, macadamia nuts, pecans, and ginseng (AMS,
2008).
For several decades prior to the implementation of COOL, agricultural and
consumer advocacy groups lobbied for country of origin labeling on food products
(Krissoff et al., 2004). Proponents of COOL argued that the policy would support U.S.
producers and benefit consumers. This argument was based on the assumption that U.S.
consumers prefer domestic products to import products and hence the demand for U.S.
products would shift outward following the implementation of COOL. As a result, both
consumers and producers would benefit.
However, further analysis indicated that COOL had the potential to impact both
supply and demand. On the supply side, producers face costs associated with compliance,
including maintaining information and labeling. Estimations of country of origin labeling
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impacts on producers, retailers, and packers indicated large cost increases for the first
year of implementation and additional costs for each subsequent year. Compliance costs
impact the market price if these costs are passed on to consumers. On the demand side, if
consumers have preferences for domestic or imported products, then they would be
willing to pay more for the product that corresponds with their preferences. Consumers
who prefer imported (or domestic) products believe these products are of a higher quality
and deserve to be compensated with a premium. Hence, COOL has the potential to shift
both supply and demand.
The size of the supply shift relative to the size of the demand shift and the relative
elasticities of supply and demand determine how producers and consumers share the
burden of compliance costs. These factors also determine how COOL impacts consumer
and producer surpluses. However, in most of cases, both consumer and producer
surpluses decrease after the implementation of COOL.
By narrowing down the scope and focusing on shrimp, the difficulties in
determining the factors that drive the potential shifts in demand and supply following the
implementation of COOL quickly became apparent. Shrimp is produced using two main
production processes. Consumers’ preferences for one production process over another
further complicate determining consumers’ preferences for domestic versus imported
shrimp. The two main shrimp production processes are farm raised and fresh catch,
sometimes referred to as wild caught. Both production processes have their benefits and
detriments. Most shrimp produced in the United States is produced by the fresh catch
process, while most imported shrimp is farm raised. Thus, consumers’ preferences for a
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particular production process further complicate disentangling the effects of country of
origin labeling on demand.
Farm raised shrimp are produced in managed in-land ponds, which allows the
farmers to precisely control the environment in which the shrimp are produced. This
creates a highly efficient production system. Producers can control the size and quantity
of the shrimp to be able to meet demands. Promoted by development agencies like the
World Bank and Asian Development Bank, shrimp farming is viewed as a way of
decreasing poverty by creating jobs. Therefore, many developing countries have invested
in this export-driven industry to attract much needed foreign capital (Environmental
Justice Foundation, 2003).
Conversely, shrimp farm operations can be a significant source of chemical and
biological pollutants and nutrient wastes. Antibiotics, algaecides, disinfectants, detergents,
and soil treatment chemicals are used in aquaculture ponds throughout the world in large
quantities (Graslund and Bengtsson, 2001). Various chemicals are used to control viral,
bacterial, fungal, and other pathogens, while other chemicals are used to induce plankton
growth and to inoculate the farmed larvae (Primevera et al., 1993). Often the polluted
land surrounding aquaculture ponds are also transformed into shrimp farms because the
polluted land is rendered useless for other purposes (Bonora, 1999).
The other more natural process is fresh catch. Fresh caught shrimp involves
harvesting shrimp directly from the ocean using a boat and a large net or trawl. This
practice has been around for centuries and is still an important facet to many American’s
livelihoods. However, the practice of shrimp trawling is also controversial. The two
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main points of contention surrounding the practice of shrimp trawling are by-catch
(unintended species accidentally caught in the trawler nets) and physical disturbance of
the ocean floor caused by the nets.
In some regions, the ratio of non-intended species to shrimp caught in the nets is
estimated to be as high as 10:1 (Dubay, Tokuoka, and Gereffi, 2010). These nonintended species are often a target species for other fishing industry (Dubay, Tokuoka,
and Gereffi, 2010). While many species end up as by-catch, sea turtles have captured the
most attention. As a result, U.S. shrimp trawlers are required to use turtle excluder
devices (TEDs). In addition, several World Trade Organization (WTO) disputes
involving the United States shrimping industry have occurred stemming from the United
States banning imported shrimp produced using the fresh catch process that did not use
turtle excluder devices. Although turtle excluder devices (TEDs), fish exclusion devices
(FEDs), and by-catch reduction devices (BRDs) have been installed on many shrimp
trawlers to reduce the amount of by-catch, the vessels’ nets still have the potential to
impact the environment.
Shrimp trawling can also damage the ocean floor. This occurs when the net or
trawl becomes heavy from the catch and the additional weight causes the trawl to drag on
the ocean floor. This process has the potential to destroy many oceanic habits. Scientists
are trying to determine whether the impacts of trawling are comparable to that of natural
occurrences such as waves.
Manmade catastrophic disasters further complicate analyzing consumers’
preferences for shrimp. On Tuesday, April 20, 2010 a British Petroleum (BP)
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Transocean oil rig, known as the DeepWater Horizon, had an explosion on board in the
Gulf of Mexico. Two days later, another explosion occurred and a five mile long oil slick
resulted from the damage (Guardian, 2010). Five days later, on April 25, 2010, the
United States Coast Guard, with the help of a remote underwater camera, discovered that
an oil well at the site of the explosion was leaking 1,000 barrels of crude oil per day
(CNBC, 2010). On April 28, the Coast Guard stated that the flow of oil was greater than
what was first estimated and 5,000 barrels of oil per day were flowing from the leak
(CNBC, 2010; Guardian, 2010). On May 2, fishing was prohibited in areas affected by
the spill for initial period of 10 days. Finally, on July 12, after several attempts, BP
stopped the oil leak (CNBC).
The leak led to extensive fishing bans in the Gulf of Mexico. While the initial ban
was implemented for only a ten day period, the ban was extended and a larger area was
closed until July 2, 2010, when fishing areas began to reopen. Of the 229,270 square
miles that were closed, only a 1,041 square mile area that encloses the spill site remained
closed on March 1, 2011 (NOAA, 2011).
The oil leak possesses the risk of stigmatizing products derived from the Gulf of
Mexico. The term ―stigma‖ is used in psychology. Stigma occurs when an object comes
into direct contact with another object that is contaminated or stigmatized (Rozin,
Millman, and Nemeroff, 1986). Both the oil that spilled in the Gulf of Mexico and the
dispersants used to break up the oil have some degree of stigma attached to them because
consumers view them as being potentially harmful to their health. Gulf Coast shrimp may
be stigmatized because they came into contact with the oil and the dispersants. Hence,
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stigma is likely to influence consumers’ shrimp purchasing behavior. Consumers’
perceptions of the oil and the clean-up chemicals can cause the consumers to make false
judgments regarding Gulf Coast shrimp. These perceptions cause the Gulf Coast shrimp
to become stigmatized even if there is nothing is potentially dangerous about consuming
the item.
Collectively, these factors influence the price a consumer is willing to pay for
shrimp. A consumer’s willingness to pay for shrimp accounts for the consumer’s
individual preferences for the shrimp production process (farm raised or fresh caught)
and the potential stigma effects that the BP oil spill has on the product. Shrimp products
harvested from Gulf of Mexico have the potential for stigma to be placed on them
because of the chemicals used in the clean-up process and the oil itself. Similarly, the
farm raised production process uses a great deal of chemicals so this process may also be
stigmatized. As a result, consumers may be willing to pay less for farm raised products or
Gulf Coast products. Additionally, consumers purchasing shrimp may prefer a domestic
or even local product. Some consumers believe that because a product originates from a
specific area that this product is of higher quality than other products. Because of this
belief consumers may be willing to pay a higher price for the domestic or local product.
The product may not be of higher value but consumers believe that it is solely because of
the product’s origin.
Additionally, other attributes of the shrimp influence how much consumers are
willing to pay for a specific type of shrimp. Some of the most influential attributes
affecting a consumer’s willingness to pay are size, appearance, smell, and taste of the
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shrimp. These attributes appeal to a consumer’s senses. Attributes vary across various
types of shrimps and consumers trade off their preferences for various attributes when
selecting which product to purchase.
Objectives
The primary objective of this thesis is to analyze how various attributes impact
willingness to pay for shrimp by conducting an experiment using the Becker-DeGrootMarschack mechanism. A theoretical model is also presented that shows how a product’s
attributes impact willingness to pay.
The model is used to explain how COOL can lead to a demand shift. Several
possible supply and demand shifts are considered to gain intuition of the potential effects
of COOL on the welfare of consumers and producers. From these examples, one can
infer that the relative elasticities of the supply and demand curves influence the impacts
of COOL on consumer surplus and producer surplus. In most of these cases, both
consumer and producer surpluses decline following the implementation of COOL.
To investigate the factors driving consumers’ purchasing decisions, an experiment
is designed and implemented that uses the Becker-DeGroot-Marschack (BDM)
mechanism to elicit consumers’ willingness to pay for shrimp. Participants revealed their
preferences by stating their highest willingness to pay for five types of shrimp: 1) Gulf
Coast Fresh Caught, 2) North Carolina/South Carolina Coast Fresh Caught, 3) United
States Farm Raised shrimp, 3) Thailand Farm Raised, and 5) United States Fresh Caught.
The Gulf Coast fresh caught shrimp was chosen to analyze potential stigma of
Gulf Coast products following the 2010 BP Gulf of Mexico oil spill. The North
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Carolina/South Carolina Coast fresh caught shrimp was selected to test for preferences
for local products; the experiment was conducted at Clemson University in South
Carolina. The United States farm raised shrimp product was selected because it was farm
raised and from the United States thus allowing comparisons against the United States
fresh caught varieties and the imported farm raised shrimp. Thailand farm raised shrimp
was selected because Thailand is the leading importer of shrimp into the United States
and the product is readily available in most U.S. supermarkets (USDA, 2011). The last
type of shrimp, (not from the North Carolina/South Carolina Coast or the Gulf Coast,
United (USA fresh caught) United States Fresh Caught was selected because of its
neutral location thus allowing for the testing of various effects.
Each type of shrimp has the potential to be stigmatized. Some consumers prefer
shrimp produced by aquaculture because of its sustainability and cost effectiveness, while
other consumers avoid consuming farm raised shrimp because of the chemicals used in
the production process. Fresh caught shrimp might appeal to some consumers because it
is a natural process, but the destruction of the ocean floor may influence how other
consumers view the product. Additionally, some consumers may devaluate shrimp from
the Gulf Coast because of stigma associated with the oil and chemicals used in the cleanup. The experimental design allows these potential stigma effects to be analyzed.
Finally, regional preferences for shrimp will be examined. By examining
regional preferences for shrimp, preferences for domestic versus imported productions
can be determined and compared. Since most of the shrimp that is imported into the
United States is farm raised, consumers might prefer domestic goods simply because they
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prefer fresh caught shrimp. The experimental design allows preferences for the product’s
origins to be separated from preferences for the production process. In addition,
preferences for local products can be investigated. South Carolina, a shrimp producing
state, has an initiative called ―SC Grown‖ where the state promotes locally grown
products. This initiative and preferences for local products can also impact willingness to
pay.
Organization of Thesis
Chapter 2 provides insight into factors that might influence consumers’
willingness to pay for shrimp products. The benefits and detriments of each of the two
production processes are discussed. By presenting the benefits and detriments of each
process a balanced and thorough perception of the processes can be obtained. Also, the
background, history, and expected costs of country of origin labeling are presented.
Stigma is defined and analyzed as it pertains to food products. Finally, various
experimental economic methods are discussed with an emphasis on experimental
auctions.
Chapter 3 introduces how attributes and perceived quality affect willingness to
pay for a product. The potential impacts of country of origin labeling on producer
surplus and consumer surplus are presented by considering various supply and demand
shifts and various relative elasticities. Finally, the cost of COOL is analyzed to determine
who, either the producers or the consumers, will bear a bigger share of the potential cost
increase.
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Chapter 4 concentrates on the data collection methods. The chapter highlights the use
of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschack (BDM) mechanism to collect the data. The selection of
the method is explained. The experimental design is discussed. The first two parts of the
experiment were designed to allow participants to learn the bidding process. In the third part
of the experiment participants were asked to bid on five types of shrimp.
Chapter 5 relays information about the experimental results. Summary of the
participants’ characteristics are presented. Regression models are assembled to estimate the
effects that the different attributes have on willingness to pay. Several different regression
models are constructed using several ordinary least squares. The models all displayed some
degree of stigma effect towards Gulf Coast products and preferences for domestic products.

Chapter 6 presents the conclusions and implications. The impact that stigma has
on the Gulf Coast shrimp industry is discussed. In addition, the benefits of country of
origin labeling to consumers are explored. Further research on the data set is also
explored. Lastly, suggested changes to the experimental design are presented. These
changes would increase efficiency and provide more thorough results.
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Chapter 2: Background and Literature Review
This chapter provides an overview of the factors that may influence consumers’
willingness to pay for shrimp products, including the process used to produce the shrimp
(farm raised or fresh catch), country of origin labeling, and the 2010 Gulf Coast oil spill.
The two shrimp production processes are highlighted with a discussion of the benefits
and detriments of each process. The details of the country of origin labeling policy are
presented as well as the estimated costs of implementing the act. In addition, the
potential impacts of COOL on commodity markets affected by the policy are presented;
specifically, the potential gains and losses to consumers and producers from the policy
are addressed. Furthermore, details regarding the 2010 British Petroleum oil spill are
presented. Because of the oil spill, stigma might impact consumers’ willingness to pay
for shrimp from the Gulf Coast. A description of this phenomenon is also presented.
Fresh Caught Shrimp
The most natural and traditional way to produce shrimp is by a process referred to
as fresh catch or wild caught. This process involves using a shrimp trawler (boat) to
harvest shrimp from the ocean. Over the past several decades, seafood harvesting has
risen due to increased demand for seafood products attributed to the rising global
population (Becker and Upton, 2008). With this rising demand for seafood, industrial
fishing and mismanagement of fisheries has become prevalent. These factors have led to
overfishing and the collapse of innumerable fish populations along with destruction of the
ocean’s fragile ecosystem (Jacquet, 2006). Thus, the practice of shrimp trawling is
controversial. The two main points of contention surrounding the practice of shrimp
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trawling are by-catch (unintended species that became accidentally caught in the trawler
nets) and the physical disturbance of the ocean floor caused by the nets.
Many non-intended species get caught in trawlers’ nets, but sea turtles present the
biggest concern. The United States Endangered Species Act of 1973 prohibited harming
sea turtles that spawn in the U.S. waters. This Act forced United States shrimp trawlers to
use turtle excluder devices (TEDs) to avoid harming sea turtles. In 1989, a law was
passed stating that shrimp harvested with any technology that may negatively affect sea
turtles may not be imported into the United States (World Trade Organization, 1998). In
1997, the United States imposed a ban on the importation of certain shrimp and shrimp
products from India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand in accordance with the 1989 law.
As a result, those countries filed a complaint with the World Trade Organization (WTO).
The United States argued that because these waters contained the same species of sea
turtles that live in U.S. waters the shrimpers in India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand
should use TEDs. This case was lost by the US on the grounds that the US had
discriminated against certain members of the WTO by giving advantages to Caribbean
countries for their usage of TEDs (World Trade Organization, 1998).
In some regions, for instance the Gulf of California, the ratio of non-intended
species caught to shrimp caught in the nets is as high as 10:1 (Dubay, Tokuoka, and
Gereffi, 2010). Most of the non-intended species that are caught and then discarded by
the shrimping industry are target species for other fishing industries (Dubay, Tokuoka,
and Gereffi, 2010). In fact, it is estimated that the value of the non-intended species
caught in shrimp trawler nets in the Gulf of California is twice the value of the shrimp
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catch (Dubay, Tokuoka, and Gereffi, 2010). One report claims that bottom trawling, the
fishing process used by shrimpers, is responsible for over half of the discarded marine
life and fish worldwide (Kelleher, 2005). In an effort to make harvesting shrimp more
species specific, turtle excluder devices (TEDs), fish exclusion devices (FEDs), and bycatch reduction devices (BRDs) have been installed on many shrimp trawlers. However,
the vessels’ nets still pose a concern. Since, they have the potential to damage the ocean
floor.
Fresh caught shrimp harvesting typically uses a trawl or a large cone-shaped net
which is dragged behind a boat. The most common type of trawl is an otter trawl (Gillett,
2008). An otter trawl is a cone-shaped net that has a body constructed of two or more
panels that are closed at the cod-end (the part of the net where the shrimp are trapped)
and has wings that laterally extend forward from the opening (Gillett, 2008). Normally, a
top panel prevents fish from escaping upwards over the top of the net (Gillett, 2008). The
net is kept open horizontally using two boards referred to as otter boards (Gillett, 2008).
Otter boards are usually very heavy and are made of wood, aluminum, or steel, or a
combination of the three materials (Gillett, 2008). The otter boards are either rectangular
or oval-shaped and are equipped with a steel sole that allows for good contact with the
ground (Gillett, 2008). The trawl opening is framed by a headline consisting of floats
that open the trawl vertically and ground gear, which maximizes the catch of shrimp
living close to the bottom of the ocean floor and protects the rest of the gear as it moves a
crossed the uneven ocean floor (Gillett, 2008). The vertical opening in the trawler net is
maintained with floats and hydrodynamic devices on the upper line and weights on the
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groundrope. A groundrope is either a chain or weighted rope that has rubber disks,
bobbins, or spacers on it to protect the trawl from damaged while dragging on the ocean
floor (Gillett, 2008).
According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations,
Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, ―many species of shrimp stay close to the bottom,
good bottom contact with the ground gear is a requirement for efficient capture‖ (FAO,
2003). However, this contact can damage the ocean floor with the majority of the
damage done by trawling being to the ocean floor itself (Koslow et al., 2000). Trawling
is the largest threat to slow-growing animals that dwell on the seafloor such as coral and
sponges (Cryer, Harthill, and O’Shea, 2002). The first documented case of concern about
the impacts of trawling on the ocean floor was in 1376, when the King of England
complained that ground fishing destroys the ―flowers‖ on the ocean floor (Austers,
Malatesta, and Babb, 1994). However, the impact of ground fishing on oceanic habitats
and the assessment of the long-term consequences are fairly hard to measure because it is
difficult to separate the damage due to fishing from damage due to natural environmental
occurrences (Gillett, 2008). Scientists are trying to determine whether the impacts of
trawling are comparable to that of natural occurrences such as waves.
Many authors have tried to describe and categorize the impacts of fishing gear on
oceanic habitats. One of the most in-depth categorizations was made by Johnson (2002).
Johnson identified five main categorizations of ocean floor damage. Those five
categories are alteration of physical structure, sediment suspension, changes in chemistry,
changes to the benthic community, and changes to the ecosystem. The alteration of
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physical structure occurs when the fishing gear causes destruction of vegetation, moves
stones, smoothes the natural sand ripples, buries mounds, scraps and plows. Damage is
categorized as sediment suspension when dragging of the fishing gear across the ocean
floor leads to reduced light, buried benthic biota, and destroyed spawning areas. As a
result of the disturbance, organisms’ metabolic processes and feeding cycles are thrown
off. Furthermore, according to Johnson, changes in chemistry occur when the fishing
gear changes the chemical composition of the sediments and water mass by mixing
interstitial water and subsurface sediments. The disturbance created by the fishing gear
has the ability to cause contaminants that have settled to move around again. The
trawling gear can disturb the surface of the sea floor up to a depth of 30 centimeters,
causing many animals to be smashed or buried, infauna to be exposed, and many times
damaged, and changes to the benthic community. Johnson’s fifth category, changes to
the ecosystem, occurs when the gear used for trawling changes the composition of a
habitat. This type of damage causes harmful effects on ecosystems and harvested
populations of sea creatures.
A great deal of research has been performed to assess the damage of fishing gear
to the oceanic habitat. For example, the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial
Research Organization (CSIRO) and the Queensland Department of Primary Industries
(QDPI) conducted a five year study, which took place in an area closed to trawling since
1985 referred to as the green zone in the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park. The
experiment showed that a single trawl removes anywhere from 5 to 25 percent of the
benthos (organisms that live on or in close proximity to the ocean floor), dependent on
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the species. Repeated trawling removes approximately 50 percent of the benthos with as
few as seven passes (CSIRO, 1998). Although, 70 percent of trawling areas are only
trawled lightly each year, the effect may still be depletion of fauna and substantial
changes in the fauna (Gillett, 2008). Because of this reduction, 20 percent of trawling
areas tend to be dominated by weedy species (CSIRO, 1998). Furthermore, the National
Research Council (NRC) conducted a study that concluded dredging and trawling
reduced the complexity of habitats. Benthic communities that are consistently trawled
undergo discernible changes that cause the benthic communities to be less productive.
The effects are cumulative and low natural disturbance areas are more vulnerable to
damage caused by the gear. In general, if the ocean bottom is a relatively flat, the
damage is typically minimal; however, when the ocean floor is a three dimensional
complex benthic habitat with raised colonies of under sea creatures the footrope of a
shrimp trawler can have a major impact (Gillett, 2008). The damage done to flat bottoms
consists of only compacting and compression caused by the cod-end of the trawl net
being dragged across the bottom of the ocean floor (Gillett, 2008).
Recently, research has been conducted to investigate if new fishing gear can help
reduce damage to oceanic habitats. Electric impulses have been tested as a replacement
for tickler chains (Gillett, 2008). Tickler chains penetrate the ocean floor to stir up
shrimp enabling them to be caught in the trawl net (Lokkenborg, 2005). Drop chains
have been investigated to replace the weights that are integrated into the groundrope to
reduce contact with the ocean floor (Gillett, 2008). Also, adding wheels on the
groundrope may reduce scraping of the trawl on the ocean bottom (Gillett, 2008). One

16

proposal to reduce destruction is to use artificial reefs that potentially interfere with
fishing to protect sensitive areas. An example of this is sea grass areas which are being
used in Cambodia (Gillett, 2008).
Recently, there has been a movement towards sustainable agriculture and this
movement has carried over to fishing industries. The Marine Stewardship Council
(MSC), founded in 1997 in London, England, was created to set environmental criteria
for sustainable and well-managed fisheries. Products meeting these requirements receive
a MSC certification label. Currently, there are only two sustainable shrimp types
available in the United States’ market and both are derived from cold water (Dubay,
Tokuoka, and Gereffi 2010). Additional sustainable shrimp varieties are an intriguing
possibility, as these shrimp might appeal to U.S. seafood distributors, retailers, and food
service companies. For example, Wal-Mart plans to have all of its wild caught fish come
from MSC certified fisheries by 2015 (Wal-Mart, 2010). However, it is unclear if
consumers are willing to pay higher prices for these products (Dubay, Tokuoka, and
Gereffi, 2010).
Farm Raised Shrimp
The main alternative to fresh catch shrimp is aquaculture or farm raised shrimp.
Shrimp farming involves the production of shrimp in managed in-land ponds. In these
ponds, shrimp farmers have the ability to precisely control the environment in which the
shrimp are produced, which creates a highly efficient production system. However,
shrimp farm operations can be a significant source of chemical and biological pollutants
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and nutrient wastes. Furthermore, antibiotics are frequently used in shrimp ponds, which
might led to resistance overtime.
Aquaculture gives the farmer the ability to control the exact size and quantity of
the shrimp produced to meet anticipated demands. Furthermore, aquaculture yields have
less variability because they are not affected by seasonal changes (Gillett, 2008). In
addition, farm raised shrimp products are less likely to possess broken shells or other
damage, which are negative attributes that cause the shrimp to have a lower grade and
affect their value, than those produced by using open capture (Dubay, Tokuoka, and
Gereffi, 2010).
Shrimp aquaculture has been promoted by development agencies and financial
institutions, like the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, as a way of decreasing
poverty. Shrimp aquaculture creates employment and generates revenue. Globally, it is
estimated that 1.2 million to 1.5 million jobs have been created because of shrimp
aquaculture (Clay, 2002). The profits associated with shrimp farming in Thailand have
been estimated to be more than 30 times the profits associated with rice farming
(Primavera, 1997). Therefore, many developing countries have adopted this exportdriven industry to attract much needed foreign capital (Environmental Justice Foundation,
2003).
It is estimated that by 2015 global production of shrimp aquaculture will increase
to 7.86 billion tons per year (Tellez Castaneda, 2009). Countries in Asia and Latin
American are expected to drive the production increase because these countries are
making significant investments in shrimp aquaculture (Dubay, Tokuoka, and Gereffi,
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2010). As a result of the large production expansion that has taken place in Asia and
Latin America, consumers in many shrimp importing countries such as the United States,
Europe, and Japan face lower prices and have more choices of shrimp products.
However, the average consumer is unaware of the larger number of chemicals
used in shrimp aquaculture. Antibiotics, algaecides, disinfectants, detergents, and soil
treatment chemicals are used throughout the world in large quantities in aquaculture
ponds (Graslund and Bengtsson, 2001). Many chemicals are used as water and soil
treatments. Chlorine, a frequently used water treatment, causes resistance to antibiotics
(Murray et al., 1984). Various chemicals are used to control viral, bacterial, fungal, and
other pathogens, while other chemicals are used to induce plankton growth and to
inoculate the farmed larvae (Primevera et al., 1993). In addition, oxidants used by shrimp
farmers have the potential to affect the health of the workers and handlers (Boyd and
Massaut, 1999). Bainy (2000) argues that disinfectants, antibiotics, pesticides, fertilizers,
and feed additives used in shrimp farming have a potential to cause toxic effects to the
cultured shrimp. Exposure to these chemicals is believed to increase stress levels,
decrease growth and increase susceptibility of infections in shrimp (Le Moullac and
Haffner, 2000). Furthermore, since shrimp aquaculture is a relatively new process, the
potential dangers to consumers of long term exposure to the various chemicals are still
unknown.
In an effort to generate additional revenue, shrimp ponds are often intensive
production systems. In a study conducted by Grasland, Holstrom, and Wahlstrom (2003)
in Thailand, 69 of the 76 farmers studied used an intensive production system. Intensive
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production systems are more susceptible to disease outbreaks and require more soil and
water treatments. Grasland, Holstrom, and Wahlstrom (2003) found that all of the
farmers in the study used soil and water treatments. Furthermore, liming compounds,
which were used by all but one farmer, were the most widely used type of treatment.
Lime adjusts pH. Some farmers used lime to kill pathogens and plankton. The farmers
also used zeolites to lower turbidity (the cloudiness of the water caused by sediments)
and to remove ammonia. In addition, the researchers found the farmers used fertilizers to
grow plankton, to improve the environment of the pond and make the food supply more
readily available. The reason that many of farmers in Thailand use chemicals is because
they are so readily available. Most of the labels, however, leave out the names of active
ingredients, percentages of ingredients, safety instructions, and how to use the products.
Furthermore, many of the chemicals used in shrimp farming have negative effects
on the ecosystems surrounding the ponds (Graslund, Holmstrom, Wahlstrom, 2003).
Pesticides can leave toxic residues behind in the pond environments (Graslund,
Holmstrom, Wahlstrom, 2003). Fertilizers used in shrimp production have the ability to
leach into waters in the vicinity of the shrimp ponds (Funge-Smith and Briggs, 1998).
Also, the salt water in the ponds can pollute the land, leading to irreversible changes
(Bann, 1997). The salinity in the soil causes plants to die and prevents plants from
growing. Often the polluted lands surrounding aquaculture ponds are also transformed
into shrimp farms because the polluted land is rendered useless for other purposes
(Bonora, 1999).
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Disease outbreaks that potentially cause an entire crop of shrimp to become
valueless are common in the shrimp aquaculture industry due to the intensity of the
production system. One of the most common and troublesome diseases is white spot
syndrome virus (WSSV), which causes death in most shrimp and other crustaceans
(Chakraborty et al., 2002). WSSV infected shrimp have white spots on their body and
decomposition of their body (Chakraborty et al., 2002). Diseases like WSSV can cause
whole shrimp crops to be unsellable (Salehi, 2008). WSSV has been known to survive
freezing and hence could be present in the frozen shrimp sold in the market. Reville et al.
(2002) estimated that 4.7 percent of shrimp sold in supermarkets have WSSV. The Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) stated that seafood is the most problematic import with
regard to pathogens, decomposition, and filth (Boinapally and Jiang, 2006). Salmonella
spp., Escherichia coli, Vibrio parahaemolyticus, and Listeria monocytogenes are the
major pathogens associated with shrimp imports (Zhao et al., 2006).
Antibiotics are used in shrimp ponds to help reduce disease outbreaks and to
induce growth. However, the more frequently antibiotics are used the more quickly the
resistance to that specific antibiotic builds up (Le et al., 2005). When resistance to an
antibiotic develops, the target bacteria are no longer killed by that particular antibiotic
and the drug is rendered useless to cure the disease. Bacteria can transfer resistant genes
to other bacteria in a process called horizontal gene transfer (Cruz and Davies, 2000).
Thus, shrimp farm handlers and workers who are exposed to these strains of resistant
bacteria often develop infections which are harder to treat (Graslund, Holmstrom, and
Wahlstrom, 2003). One of the main antibiotics used in shrimp aquaculture,
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fluoroquinolones, is also used to treat human pathogens, so the buildup of resistance is of
great concern (Graslund, Holmstrom, and Wahlstrom, 2003). A study conducted in
Thailand by Graslund, Holmstrom, and Wahlstrom in 2003, found that the farmers often
mixed antibiotics into fish food with their bare hands; this process causes both the skin
and the respiratory track to be exposed to the antibiotics. Additionally, the practice of
handling antibiotics has ill effects of its own, including dermatitis from sulfonamide or
aplastic anemia from chloramphenicol (Rice and Cohen, 1996).
Even though the United States has regulations on the use of antibiotics in shrimp
aquaculture, many countries do not have similar regulations in place (Alderman and
Hastings, 2008). Lack of regulations in these countries results in the overuse of
antibiotics, which causes resistance among pathogens in humans and shrimp (Brown,
1989). One study found antibiotic-resistant salmonella in aquatic food products (Zhoa et
al., 2006).
Another study showed that farm raised imported shrimp are less responsive to
antibiotics than wild caught South Carolina shrimp (Boinapally and Jiang, 2006).
Ecuadorian shrimp and Thailand shrimp showed the most resistance to antibiotics, while
other products such as those coming from China, India, and a different Thailand shrimp
sample displayed receptiveness to antibiotics similar to the wild caught South Carolina
sample (Boinapally and Jiang, 2006).
New studies have implicated that probiotics could be used to help reduce the
number of chemicals used by shrimp farmers. Since overuse of antibiotics may lead to
resistance and reduced efficiency on humans, the use of probiotic control agents to
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destroy bacteria is also being explored (Vaseeharan and Ramasamy, 2003). A probiotic
is a live bacterium that is perceived to be healthy for a host organism. Probiotics are
often used in the animal industry to displace pathogens by competitive processes and are
viewed as a better alternative to antibiotics (Moriaty, 1999). In some ponds Vibro, a gut
organism that effect shrimp, has been seen to increase when antibiotics are used (Moriaty,
1999). However, with the use of probiotics these problems decrease (Moriaty, 1999).
Moriaty (1999) reported 80-100 percent survival for shrimp infected with disease when
treated with probiotics in an experiment in Negros, Philippines.
Moreover, overfishing of the seas is one of the main reasons for the use of
aquaculture; however, shrimp are carnivorous and require fish meal. ―Ten million tons of
herring, mackerel and sardine that could have been directly consumed by people ended
up as processed fishmeal instead‖ (Schwartz, 2010). Thus, while aquaculture is supposed
to reduce the intensity of overfishing, it may actually increase it. Recently, research has
been conducted to try to find alternatives to the amount of fish oil used in aquatic feeds.
No statistical difference was found in final mean weights, growth, and survival between
shrimp that had been fed using soybean oil and shrimp that had been fed fish oil
(González-Félix et al., 2010). The production yield was also similar to that of the shrimp
that were fed fish oils. Furthermore, the study concluded that shrimp can be raised using
a plant based diet in order to substitute marine oil with lipid sources used in feeds
(Gonzalez-Felix et al., 2010).
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Background of Country of Origin Labeling
In 2002, Congress amended the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946, in the 2002
Farm Security and Rural Investment Act. This act contained a provision that required
―covered commodities‖ to be labeled with their country of origin. ―Covered commodities‖
that require the special labels are muscle cuts of beef, lamb, and pork, ground beef,
ground lamb, and ground pork, farm raised fish and shellfish, wild fish and shellfish,
items referred to as perishable agriculture commodities, and peanuts. Perishable
agricultural commodities include all fresh and frozen fruits and vegetables.
The act was slated to go into effect in 2004 (Agricultural Marketing Service,
2008). However, implementation was delayed. Fish and shellfish were the first products
required to comply with implementation occurring on April 4, 2005 (Agricultural
Marketing Service, 2008). Implementation of the policy for the rest of the covered
commodities finally occurred on September 30, 2008 (Agricultural Marketing Service,
2008). By the time mandatory country of origin labeling, commonly referred to as
COOL, went into effect, the list of covered commodities had grown to include chicken,
goat, ground chicken, ground goat, macadamia nuts, pecans, and ginseng (Agricultural
Marketing Service, 2008).
Food establishments, such as restaurants, and processed food items do not have to
adhere to COOL requirements (Agricultural Marketing Service, 2008). Processed food
items include retail food items covered by COOL that have undergone a process that
changes the composition of the product (e.g. grilling, boiling, roasting, etc.) (Agricultural
Marketing Service, 2008). COOL exemptions include salad bars and delis located in
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stores. For instance, a local supermarket’s salad bar does not have to contain country of
origin labels (Agricultural Marketing Service, 2008).
For an agricultural product to have the United States of America origin label on
the package, the commodity must be produced exclusively in the United States. For plant
derived products, the plants must be grown in the US. Labeling of animal products is a bit
more complicated. COOL requires animal products labeled as U.S. products to be born,
raised, and slaughtered in the United States. If one of these steps takes place outside the
US, then the label must provide consumers with knowledge of where those processes
took place and the product will be designated as a multiple or mixed origin product.
Ground products must be labeled with the countries’ commodities that are present in
them and the countries’ commodities believed to be present in them.
Gathering and maintaining this information means that records must be kept,
which can potentially create a financial burden. COOL requires that detailed records be
kept on products for two years and upon the United States Department of Agriculture’s
request the records must be provided within five days. Fines of $10,000 per violation can
be issued by the Secretary of Agriculture (COOL’s top authority) if producers covered by
COOL fail to comply (Agricultural Marketing Service, 2008).
For several decades, agricultural and consumer advocacy groups lobbied for
country of origin labeling on food products (Krissoff et al., 2004). The groups lobbying
for COOL were cow-calf producers and fruit and vegetable grower and shipper
associations (Krissoff et al., 2004). Proponents of COOL argued that the policy would
support U.S. producers and benefit consumers. Proponents of COOL relied primarily on a
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―consumer’s right to know‖ argument when stating the merits of the policy (Lusk et al.,
2006). Although some studies suggested that consumers might be willing to pay
premiums for meat products of U.S. origin (e.g., Umberger et al., 2003), Lusk et al. (2006)
point out that beyond the ―right to know‖ argument, comparatively little work has been
done to investigate why consumers might want COOL. The Agricultural Marketing
Service states that mandatory country of origin labels provide consumers with additional
information on which to base their purchasing decisions and ensure that consumers
receive accurate information regarding where the covered commodity was derived. A
study of consumers’ willingness to pay for country of origin labeling concluded that
consumers are ―very concerned about source verification and labeling issues, and as a
consequence, are willing to pay a high premium for the mandatory country of origin
labeling program‖ (Loureiro and Umberger, 2003).
Moreover, COOL is thought to support United States’ producers. This is based on
the assumption that if consumers knew that a food item was ―made in the USA‖ they
would be more inclined to purchase that food item. ―Consumers might prefer products
from their country because of an affinity for their home‖ (Lusk et al, 2006). Also, U.S.
foods are thought of as having a higher quality because of the strict safety and strict
certification processes (for instance organic) (Organic Certification and Labeling in the
United States, 2007). Therefore, consumers may use country of origin labels to reduce
their food safety concerns while supporting United States’ producers (Krissoff et al,
2004). In addition, some U.S. consumers may choose to not purchase goods identified as
originating from outside the United States.
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However, voluntary country of origin labels were often absent before COOL was
implemented. If a country of origin label was present on a package, it was smaller than
and less apparent than the other labeled attributes of the product. One possible
explanation for the lack of voluntary country of origin labels is food suppliers saw little
or no advantage in displaying a products origin (Krissoff et al, 2004). Krissoff et al.,
(2004) believe there are four possible reasons why U.s S. producers did not display
country-of-origin labels; 1) consumers may not care where their food comes from, 2)
consumers might prefer the imported product 3) consumers might prefer domestic
products but are not willing to pay higher prices to cover labeling costs, and 4) consumers
demand labels and are willing to pay higher prices to cove the labeling costs but markets
are inefficient (hence the lack of labels represents a market failure). These scenarios are
explained in more detail in the next chapter.
Consumers may prefer domestic products over imported food products or vice
versa when attributes can be differentiated. Consumers may prefer imported or domestic
products because they viewed those products as superior. For instance, lamb from New
Zealand and Australia is often perceived to be of high quality and hence some consumers
are willing to pay more for lamb from these countries. Most consumers will use the
country of origin label as a proxy for quality and safety as in the previous example
(Hobbs, 2003). Umberger et al. (2002) performed an experiment and concluded that
consumers were willing to pay a premium of seventy cents per pound for United States
corn fed beef over the grass feed imported Argentinean beef. Umberger et al. (2002)
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asked participants to bid on each steak tasted and rate the attributes of the steaks to elicit
willingness to pay.
Alternatively if labeling does not influence consumers’ purchasing decisions, then
these labels would not increase producers’ incomes. Similarly, COOL requirements
might cause producers’ labeling costs to outweigh the increased demand. Thus, COOL
would raise the price of the commodity and consumers might abandon purchasing that
product. Furthermore, since country of origin is generally not an attribute that a
consumer can taste, consumers will have to decide whether the information is accurate.
Moreover, producers must bear costs associated with compliance. These costs
include maintaining additional records and labeling costs. To ensure the accuracy of
country of origin labels, information has to be kept and transferred to each member of the
supply chain, which is a process that could prove to be quite complicated and costly
(Krissoff et al, 2004). However, some industries and/or markets already have this
process in place. For example organic foods producers have to maintain records in order
to make organic claims. Thus, if the affected firms already keep these records, then
complying with COOL requirements would not be difficult or costly.
Estimates for implementing COOL for producers, retailers, and packers ranged
from $500 million to $4 billion for the first year of implementation and yearly costs
estimates ranged $100 million and $600 million for each year after the labeling system
has been in place for ten years (Lusk and Anderson, 2004). The USDA estimated the
cost of implementation to be $582 million for the first year of COOL and $458 million
for maintenance each year for all covered commodities (Lusk and Anderson, 2004).
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However, the USDA believes that the additional capital costs could potentially balloon to
$3.9 billion (Lusk and Anderson, 2004). However, these figures may be low because the
USDA underestimated country of origin labeling costs on fish and shellfish (Talley,
2008). Food retailers were predicted to lose $952 million in the first year (Ikenson, 2004).
This translated to an average increase of seven cents per pound for beef and a four cent
increase for pork, lamb, and goat (Ikenson, 2004).
The initial estimated costs to industries affected by COOL were $1.968 billion,
but this preliminary prediction did not include the additional commodities added prior to
implementation (Agricultural Marketing Service, 2008). The costs shares were expected
to be $1 billion for the producers, $627.75 million for retailers and $340 million for
handlers (Lusk and Anderson, 2004). Van Sinkle et al. (2003) believed that the total
tracking costs for COOL would be between $69.86 and $193.43 million. As a result,
pork was projected to increase by $10.22/head for a total increase of over $1 billion with
exports declining as much as 50 percent (Hayes and Meyer 2003). The pork industry was
also expected to potentially lose 1,000 producers and three to five United States pork
packing plants were expected to close leading to an aggregate loss of over $4 billion
(Grier and Kohl, 2003). The beef industry was also projected to lose around $3 billion
(Umberger et al., 2003). However, this estimate came under fire because it was based on
willingness to pay experiment which asked participants to compare a U.S. certified
product to a generic non-labeled one. Conversely, Plain and Grimes (2003) believed that
since almost 90 percent of muscle cuts and roughly 75 percent of ground beef products
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are already of United States origin cost of compliance would be low and consumers
would not have to pay a premium for these products.
Compliance with COOL regulations causes additional supply chain costs on
processors. Meat is frequently transferred from Canada to the United States and vice
versa for different steps of processing; these products would have to carry mixed origin
labels which potentially could deter consumers (Hobbs, 2003). In turn, this could deter
the use of Canadian products by processors (Hobbs, 2003). Lusk and Anderson (2004)
also project indirect loses, coming from feeder pigs and stocker cattle from Canada. The
new rules will not allow these products to claim United States of America origin.
Lusk and Anderson (2004) used models to simulate the implementation of COOL.
They found in separate single sector models of the pork and beef industries that most of
the costs are a burden to consumers, with producers’ cost shares being minimal for record
keeping and transaction costs. As a result, consumers would experience a decline in
consumer surplus but producers surplus would not be impacted. However, if a regulatory
structure was in place where most of the costs are on producers, this would have a large
negative impact on producer surplus. Lusk and Anderson’s multi-market model indicate
that costs shares are important. When 50 percent or more of costs fall on producers, then
the effect on producer surplus is large and negative and chicken producers have the
opportunity to gain due to substitution effects as consumers substitute away from pork
and beef (Lusk and Anderson, 2004). Note that the authors conducted their analysis
before chicken was added to the list of covered commodities. However, if COOL
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increases the demand for covered products, loses to producer surplus may be offset (Lusk
and Anderson, 2004).
COOL was proposed following an outbreak of bovine spongiform encephalopathy,
commonly referred to as mad-cow disease. Records kept for COOL could also facilitate
the establishment of a trace back system, which is very important for food safety should
an unforeseen outbreak occur. Such a system could minimize both private and public
costs. Track back systems can prevent an entire industry for a commodity from being
ruined.
Country of origin labeling, farm raised and fresh caught, give consumers several
choices when purchasing shrimp in the market. However, further complicating
consumers’ choices are events that have potentially harmful effects to the shrimping
industry.
2010 BP Gulf Coast Oil Spill
On Tuesday, April 20, 2010 a Transocean (brand) oil rig named the Deepwater
Horizon explosion on board and erupted into a blaze. The rig was part of British
Petroleum’s (BP) Macondo project, located 42 miles off of the Venice, Louisiana coast
drilling at depths 5,000 feet under water and 13,000 feet under the seabed (CNBC, 2010).
There were 126 crew members aboard the station when it exploded -- 115 of them were
accounted for with 17 having to be evacuated off the rig for medical attention and 11
missing (McClain, 2010). Two days later, another explosion occurred. A five mile long
oil slick resulted from the damage (Guardian, 2010). The next day, the United States
Coast Guard called off the search for the 11 missing workers because they were
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presumed to be dead and the rig was located flipped over a quarter of a mile from the
original explosion site.
On April 25, 2010, the United States Coast Guard, with the help of a remote
underwater camera, discovered that an oil well at the site of the explosion was leaking
1,000 barrels of crude oil per day (CNBC, 2010). In response to this revelation, the
Coast Guard approved a plan to use underwater vehicles to attach a blowout preventer to
stop the leak. Fifteen thousand gallons of dispersants and 21,000 feet of containment
boom were used at the site of the explosion in an effort to contain the oil (Guardian,
2010). BP’s stock shares dropped 2 percent due to investors’ fears of the clean-up efforts
financial obligation.
Then, on April 28, the Coast Guard stated that the flow of oil was greater than
what was first estimated and that 5,000 barrels of oil per day was flowing from the leak
(CNBC, 2010; Guardian, 2010). Fire was set to the oil slick located 20 miles off the
coast of Louisiana in an attempt to reduce pollution. The next day, President Obama
made his first public comment on the leak and assured the public that every resource
would be used to contain the spill, but he noted that BP was to be held accountable for
the clean-up efforts. On April 29, 2010, Governor Bobby Jindal of Louisiana declared
Louisiana a state of emergency because oil was approaching land and feared that oil
would destroy natural resources. Off-shore drilling was prohibited in new locations and
all oil rigs in the Gulf of Mexico were required to be inspected for safety to reduce the
occurrence of another disaster.

32

On May 2nd, fishing was prohibited in areas affected by the spill for a period of 10
days. The same day, President Obama visited the Gulf Coast to observe the oil spill
firsthand and BP began the process of drilling a relief well next to the failed well. On
May 5th, BP successfully caped the leaking valve, but the amount of oil leaking in the
ocean was not diminished because of two additional leaks. The next day oil made landfall
on Chandeleur Island off the Louisiana coast; Chandeleur Island is an island that is
uninhabited but part of the Breton National Wildlife Refuge. The fishing ban was
modified to include additional waters and was extended until May 17. A researcher at
Purdue University, Steve Wereley told the press, on May 13th, that he believes that the
well was actually leaking 70,000 barrels per day.
A day later, a new plan to stop the oil spill was devised. The plan was to insert a
4 inch tube into the ruptured 21 inch pipe. The tube was indented to bring oil to the
surface where it could be sequestered. This tactic worked and oil began to surface.
However two weeks later, BP admitted that the device was not working as well as
planned and most of the oil was not actually being captured (Guardian, 2010). So, on
May 26th a ―top kill‖ maneuver was begun, which involved pumping mud and cement
into the pipe to seal off the pipe in an attempt to clog the leak. This process failed and
BP’s stock price dropped 17 percent (CNN, 2010). On June 1, 2010 the United States
Justice Department began its criminal investigation into the leak (Guardian, 2010).
Meanwhile, the United States closed more federal fishing waters; by this point, 37
percent of the federal waters in the Gulf of Mexico were closed (CNBC, 2010).
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On June 2nd, BP attempted to stop the leak by putting a containment cap on the
leak. This cap was effective in collecting 1,000 barrels per day; however, the United
States government estimated that as much as 19,000 barrels per day might were leaking
out of the oil well (CNBC, 2010). As BP attempted to stop the leak, tar balls began to
wash ashore in Florida. By this time, BP’s market value of its stock had fallen $50
billion since the start of the oil spill.
On June 16th the oil giant set up a relief fund to pay victims damages resulting
from the spill. In addition, BP agreed to pay lost wages to workers who are not able to
work due to the ban of deep sea drilling.
In the following month, oil was spotted ashore in Mississippi for the first time on
June 27th. The next week, Hurricane Alex strikes and stirs up oil creating fear of mass
amounts of oil washing ashore. Following the hurricane, supertankers were converted
into ―super skimmers‖, which could suck up to 500,000 barrels of oil from the water per
day (CNBC, 2010). Additional storms hit the Gulf of Mexico and caused more oil to
wash into Louisiana’s wetlands and into Lake Pontchartrain. Meanwhile, tar balls
washed ashore in Texas, which meant that all of the states boarding the Gulf of Mexico
had been affected with tar.
On July 12, BP installed a new cap with a better seal. Three days later, BP
announces that it has stopped the leak (CNBC). Several months later on November 25,
tar balls were discovered in a shrimping trawl close to the spill site. This site was closed
for fishing but has since been reopened.
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The leak led to extensive fishing bans in the Gulf of Mexico. While the initial ban
was implemented for only a ten day period, the ban was extended. Federal waters that
were closed on May 2, 2010 began reopening on July 2, 2010. In October of 2010, when
the experiment was performed, 10.9 percent of the waters were closed. Of the 229,270
square miles that were closed, only a 1,041 square mile area that encloses the spill site
remained closed on March 1, 2011 (NOAA, 2011).
Nearly six thousand people along with 445 ships and 11 aircrafts assisted in the
cleanup efforts (BP, 2010). A total of 3,256,547 feet of boom were used to assist in the
cleanup (BP, 2010). The amount of oil that was skimmed from the leak was 827,046
barrels and an additional 265,450 barrels were burn off the ocean in a controlled burn (BP,
2010). During the duration of the leak 1,072,514 gallons of surface dispersants were
used and 771,272 gallons of subsurface dispersants were used in the cleanup effort (BP,
2010).
The potential for another oil spill lingers. Currently, there are more than 27,000
abandoned oil wells in the Gulf of Mexico owned by various companies including BP,
with some of these rigs being there since the 1940’s. State officials estimate that most of
the rigs are badly sealed leaving the door open for more potential leaks (Guardian, 2010).
Stigma Effects
Because of the oil spill, consumers might have developed a stigma regarding the
consumption of shrimp that has been captured from the Gulf of Mexico. Stigma is a term
that has deep roots in the field of psychology. Rozin (2004) describes stigma as ―a
negative feature that typically pervades and dominates an otherwise acceptable entity.‖
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Stigma can be passed on to other objects by a process called contagion. This occurs when
an object comes into direct contact with an object that is contaminated or stigmatized
(Rozin, Millman, and Nemeroff, 1986). Many times when an item becomes stigmatized
people often consider how the object impacts their health. People often tend to have
negative feelings when they come into contact with an item that has been contaminated
(Rozin 2004). In this case, shrimp is the object that came into contact with oil. Both the
oil that spilled in the Gulf of Mexico and the dispersants used to break up the oil have
some degree of stigma attached to them. The stigma effects are likely to influence
consumers’ shrimp purchasing behavior.
BP (2010) highlighted that potential harmful effects that could occur ―through the
consumption of seafood that is tainted with oil and dispersants.‖ However, they also said
that steps were in place to ensure that human impacts were minimized. These steps
included determining if any of the compounds from the dispersants reside in seafood
harvested from the Gulf Coast and determining the risks to humans when consumed.
Furthermore, it was reported that in Louisiana at the beginning of the spill more than 300
people became sick and 75 percent of those folks that became ill were working on the
cleanup effort. The symptoms appeared to be caused by exposure to hydrocarbons or
hydrogen sulfide, but the exact cause of the illnesses was not determined (Solomon and
Janssen 2010).
Farm raised shrimp also has the potential to become stigmatized. Farm raised
shrimp uses a lot of chemical. This relationship is similar to that of the 2010 BP Gulf of
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Mexico oil spill and the chemical dispersants. Also, farm raised shrimp may have disease
outbreaks, these outbreaks may also cause consumers to purchase other products.
A recent study conducted by Kanter, Messer and Kaiser (2008) found that food
purchase decisions are affect by stigma. The authors found that stigma influenced
willingness to pay for milk with rBST. They employ the Becker DeGroot Marshack
(BDM) method to elicit participant’s willingness to pay for nine types of milk. The nine
types of milk were presented to participants in three flights. Each flight contained three
samples of milk with different fat contents but the same type of milk (conventional,
rBST-free, or organic). Participants were asked to taste the milk and then answer two
questions on the quality and freshness. The authors concluded that the stigma effect is
influenced by the order in which the participants tasted the milk in the experiment. The
stigma effect is present when conventional milk was first tasted. Also, they concluded
that all milk types are stigmatized by the introduction of rBST-free and organic milk.
Several other food products have been stigmatized by different forms of stigma.
Spam, the canned meat, has been perceived as an unhealthy food that is mostly consumed
by poor urban Americans (Lewis, 2000). Genetically modified (GM) foods have also
been stigmatized. There are many ethical dilemmas that arise from ―how far science
should alter nature‖ (Bruce, 2002). These ethical dilemmas impact consumer’
preferences and their willingness to pay for GM and non-GM products
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Risk and Consumption
Recent studies pertaining to risk and foods performed by Sparks and Shepard
(1994) indicate that participants seem to have overoptimistic bias; participants rate their
own probability of susceptibility lower than other peoples risk when confronted with food
safety risk. Additionally, a study conducted by Dosman, Adamowicz, and Hrudley (2001)
found gender was the most important factor in determining a person’s risk associated
with food safety. Women were most likely to be concerned about additives, bacteria, and
pesticides in food. Also, Dosman Adamowicz and Hrudley (2001) food safety
perceptions are influenced by income, number of children, age, and voting preferences. A
study performed by Lusk and Coble (2005) concluded that individuals that ate genetically
modified foods were more risk loving than other individuals that did not consume
genetically modified foods. Lusk and Coble (2005) found that the risk attitudes elicited
in their experiment were significantly related to participants’ stated preferences for
genetically modified food. Consumers risk preferences are likely to impact their
willingness to pay for the shrimp products.
Eliciting Willingness to Pay
There are several different methods that can be used to elicit consumers’
willingness to pay. The most common methods are contingent valuation, experimental
auctions, and conjoint analysis. Contingent valuation uses surveys to elicit valuation for
non-market resources. Contingent valuation, proposed by Ciriacy-Wantrup in 1947, is a
way to elicit the market valuation of a non-market good by using open ended questions.
Conjoint analysis uses a set number of attributes to analyze what attributes are the most
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influential in making a choice or decision. Again, conjoint analysis relies heavily on data
collected by surveys. Conjoint analysis often has very strict assumptions. These
assumptions are the good must be represented by a mutually exclusive attribute set, the
attributes must be transferable to other consumers, the total utility is equal to the sum of
the utilities of each attribute, and goods that have higher overall utility are more attractive
to consumers. The third method of eliciting willingness to pay makes use of
experimental auctions. The two types of auctions most frequently used in economics are
the Vickrey auction (1961) and the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism
(1964). Both of these auctions are incentive compatible with the expected utility
framework. In a Vickrey or second price auction, the top bidder purchases the item at the
second highest partcipant’s price. The bidding mechanism is easy to understand; however,
participants might encounter difficulty understanding the optimal bidding strategy, which
is to bid their true value for the item. On the other hand, the BDM mechanism’s sale
price is based on a random price. All bidders who bid over the random price purchase the
item. Unlike the Vickery auction, the BDM mechanism does not suffer from an
overbidding bias; with the BDM method both buyers and non-buyers are happy with their
outcomes, while with the Vickery auction only the top bidder is happy with the outcome
(Wertenbroch and Skiera, 2002). However, the bidding process is more quickly
understood in Vickery auctions than with the BDM Mechanism (Noussair et al., 2004).
In the experiment, the BDM mechanism is used to elicit willingness to pay.
Because prices are determined at random using the BDM mechanism, the overbidding
bias that will occur with the Vickrey auction is a non-issue. Bidders do not have an
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incentive to increase their true willingness to pay in order to purchase an item. In order
to correct for the difficulty of learning the bidding process, practice rounds are used so
that the participants will learn how to correctly place their willingness to pay on an item.
The BDM mechanism was also selected for this experiment because of it is incentive
compatible in an expected utility framework and for its demand-revealing properties
when using private goods. Karni and Safra (1987) and Horowitz (2006) acknowledge the
BDM mechanism, using private goods where the price is unknown, might not be
incentive compatible unless using the expected utility model. The assumption of
expected utility and the numerous experimental studies demonstrating the demand
reveling characteristics of the BDM mechanism in induced-value settings provide validity
to this method (Irwin et al., 1998).
Measuring Willingness to Pay for Shrimp Attributes
In the experiment, described in the next chapter, we used the BDM mechanism to
elicited consumers’ willingness to pay for five different shrimp types. By using the BDM
method we attempt to determine if consumers have preferences for shrimp products
origin and if consumers benefit from COOL on shrimp products. Since consumers may
have also preferences for the production process used to produce the shrimp (fresh catch
or farm raised) and willingness to pay may be impacted by potential stigma effects
resulting from the BP 2010 Gulf Coast oil spill, our experimental design allows us to
analyze these factors as well. Thus differentiation between potential preferences for local
products, stigma effects, and country of origin effects is possible.
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The local effect is presumed to be present because South Carolina is a shrimp
producing state and consumers may have preferences for commodities produced in the
region where they live. A stigma effect also seems plausible because oil was leaking in
the Gulf of Mexico for an extended period of time. Even though seafood harvested from
the Gulf of Mexico has been declared safe to for human consumption, stigma may
influence people’s perceptions of the food impacting their willingness to pay for the
commodity.
Collectively, these factors contribute to the difficulty of estimating the willingness
to pay for the shrimp product and accessing the impacts of COOL. Most importer shrimp
is farm raised, while most shrimp is produced in the U.S. is fresh catch. Therefore, it can
be difficult to separate preferences for the product’s origin from preferences for the
production process. The next chapter presents a model of how specific attributes impact
a consumer’s wiliness to pay for a product. However, our experimental design allows us
to determine how country of origin labeling, production processes and stigma affect
purchasing decisions.
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Chapter 3: Theory
In this chapter, a model of how a product’s attributes influence consumers’
willingness to pay for the product is presented. By allowing consumption goods to be a
function of attributes, the effects of stigma, the product’s origin and the production
process on willingness to pay for the product and demand can be modeled. Building on
this model, impacts are displayed on how the elasticities of demand and supply affect
how the costs of country of origin labeling are shared by producers and consumers. The
impacts of country of origin labeling on consumer surplus and producer surplus is also
explored.
Impacts of Perceived Attributes on Utility
Willingness to pay is usually thought of as a Hicksian surplus measure.
Willingness to pay can be derived in several different ways. Following Lusk and Hudson
(2004), three of those ways are presented here. First, consider a simple consumer utility
maximization problem subject to a budget constraint where the attributes (α) of a good (x)
are held constant. Also, assume that all other goods are represented by a numeraire good
(Z) with a price of one. Assume that the good’s attributes impacts the consumer’s utility.
The consumer decides how much of good (x) and good (Z) to consume to maximize
his/her utility. The consumer’s maximization problem is displayed in Eq. 3.1.

Eq. 3.1

( ( ) )

Where P is the price of good x and I is the consumer’s income. The solution to the
consumer’s utility maximization problem produces the Marshallian demand curve for
good x, x(p,I,α), where α is a set of attributes belonging to the good. Using the
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Marshallian demand curves, the consumer’s indirect utility, v(p,I,α), can be derived.
Next assume that there is an increase in desirable attributes from α0 to α1. The
willingness to pay for the change in attributes can be determined by the following
equality:

Eq. 3.2

(

)

(

)

In other words, the consumer would we willing to forego income equal to WTP to obtain
the more desirable set of attributes.
Now consider the dual expenditure minimization problem of the consumer. In this
problem, the consumer chooses the amount of each good (xi) to consume in order to
minimize expenditures subject to maintaining a fixed level of utility, U. As shown below
in Eq. 3.3:

Eq. 3.3

(

( ( ) )

)

The solutions to the standard first order conditions of the consumer’s expenditure
minimization problem produce the Hicksian demand curves, xh(p,U,α), where U is a
fixed level of utility. The indirect expenditure function, m(p,U,α), can be derived by
substituting the Hicksian demand curves into the objective function. Again assume there
is an increase in desirable attributes from α0 to α1. The value the consumer places on the
change in the attributes is his/her willingness to pay (WTP) and it can be derived as
follows:

Eq. 3.4

(

)
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Willingness to pay can also be constructed by allowing the consumer to choose
both the level of the attributes and the level of consumption good, x, to consume. The
level of attributes associated with each good is set exogenously.

Eq. 3.5

(

)

(

)

The resulting Hicksian demand curves are xh(p,g,U) and αh(p,g,U), where g is the price
of α and αh(p,g,U) is the Hicksian demand for the attribute. The inverse of the Hicksian
demand for the attribute is the willingness to pay curve for the attribute and is denoted
g(αh,p,U). The WTP function demonstrates the price a consumer is willing to pay for a
certain set of attributes at a given level of p and U. The change in WTP resulting from a
change in attributes from α0 to α1 is:

Eq. 3.6

∫

(

)

)

Using the willingness to pay function (the inverse of the Hicksian demand) and the
envelope theorem, the impact that changing an attribute has on WTP can be determined.
(

Eq. 3.7

)

Thus, it is possible to determine willingness to pay and how a change in attributes, either
positive or negative, affects purchasing decisions.
Impacts of COOL Supply and Demand
One example of an attribute that may impact willingness to pay for a good is the
product’s country of origin and hence demand may be impacted by COOL. Country of
origin labeling can also affect the supply. However, little research has been conducted to
determine how country of origin labeling impacts supply and demand. To date, the best

44

description of the impact of COOL on supply and demand is provided by Krissoff et al.
(2004).
Krissoff et al. (2004) propose two scenarios that may occur when commodities
become covered by COOL. The first case occurs when markets are efficient and the
second case occurs when mandatory labeling corrects a markets failure. In the first case,
labels are not supplied prior to the implementation of COOL because consumers do not
want labels and hence are not willing to pay for them. In the second case, consumers
demand labels but they are not supplied prior to COOL because of a market failure. In the
first case, there are costs associated with COOL but no benefits. In the second case, label
conscious consumers receive benefits from country of origin labeling; however, all
consumers face higher prices.
Figure 3.1 displays Krissoff et al.’s first case where markets are efficient. The
consumers are represented by the downward sloping demand curve, signifying that as
prices rise the quantity demanded falls. Following the assumptions made by the authors,
the suppliers are assumed to be represented by a horizontal supply curve, displaying
constant average and marginal costs of production. The assumption of constant average
and marginal costs of production is a rather strict assumption, which I later relax. The
intersection of the demand curve (D1) and the supply curve (S1) (point a) determine the
equilibrium price (P1) and quantity (Q1) of the commodity before the implemented
country of origin labeling.
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Source: Krissoff et al. (2004)
Figure 3.1: Labeling Leads to Additional Costs
To comply with COOL suppliers will have to incur additional costs associated
with labeling, recordkeeping, and new operating procedures. In Figure 3.1, this is
displayed by supply shifting upward from S1 to S2 when COOL is implemented. In this
case, the demand curve is unaffected by the implementation of COOL. This suggests that
consumers do not want labels. These preferences are already reflected in the demand
curve and hence no labels were provided prior to the implementation of COOL. This
suggests the market is efficient and firms would have provided the labels if consumers
were willing to pay for the cost of the information.
Once COOL is implemented, the new equilibrium price and quantity is defined by
point b or the intersection of S2 and D1. As a result of COOL, consumers will face a
higher price and hence they will purchase less of the commodity covered by COOL; thus
quantity demanded will fall from Q1 to Q2. By using a conventional measure of
consumer welfare, consumer surplus, consumers are worse off because of the price
increase. Food suppliers are modeled as being part of a competitive industry (represented
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by the horizontal supply curve) so that they earn a normal rate of return on their products
and are able to pass the country of origin labeling costs on to the consumers. The
consumers purchase less of the commodity because of the higher price, which causes the
industry to shrink. This implies that some of the food suppliers will have to exit the
industry by going out of business.
In Figure 3.2, corresponding to the second case of Krissoff et al. (2004), there are two
separate groups of consumers: consumers who prefer labels and consumers who are
indifferent to having labels. Market efficiency is relaxed and the authors assume no
incentives are provided to sell labeled foods prior to the implementation of COOL. As a
result, prior to the implementation of COOL, no labels are available and consumers
cannot purchase domestic commodities with certainty; consumers can only use their
knowledge about products or make assumptions to determine a product’s origin. Also,
Krissoff et al. (2004) assume once COOL is implement no unlabeled goods can be sold in
the market because all commodities are either U.S. labeled or foreign labeled. Although
never directly stated, the authors also assume that consumers prefer domestic goods.
Using these assumptions, Krissoff et al. (2004) compare the quantity demand
before country of origin labeling (points Q1L and Q1NL) with the quantity demanded after
country of origin labeling is enacted (points Q2L and Q2NL). Since the label preferring
consumers value the labels and are willing to pay for the information, the demand for the
labeled product increases with the implementation of COOL. Whether or not the label
preferring consumers are better off after the implementation of COOL depends on their
willingness to pay for the information and the cost of providing labeling. It is possible
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that even the consumers who prefer the labels will be worse off after the implementation
of COOL. However, Figure 3.2 is constructed such that label preferring consumers are
better off with COOL. In other words, the increase in willingness to pay is greater than
the price increase. The quantity demanded by the label preferring group increase
minimally with the implementation of COOL and these consumers are better off even
when considering the price increase. After the implementation of COOL, the group of
consumers that are indifferent about labeling will purchase less of the good and their
consumer surplus will decrease because of the higher price.

Source: Krissoff et al. (2004)
Figure 3.2: Label Preferring and Label Indifferent Groups
However, it is impossible to determine the net welfare effect on all consumers.
Even though most consumers are assumed to prefer country of origin labeling, it is still
possible that the total quantity demand (Q2L + Q2NL) will fall because of higher price
(resulting from the increase in marginal costs). Alternatively, if the label preferring
group was to have a higher willingness to pay for labeled product then in Figure 3.2, the
demand line would shift further to the right than proposed. The increase of quantity
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demanded by the preferring label group (Q2L) would exceed the decline in quantity
demanded by the group indifferent to labeling (Q2NL). This would indicate that the
supplying industry would expand production. However, since it is assumed that the good
is supplied by a competitive industry, the producers’ costs of complying with COOL are
still passed on to consumers. The net change in consumer surplus of COOL depends on
the number of consumers in each of the two consumer groups.
While Krissoff et al. (2004) acknowledge the difference between consumers that
prefer labels and those that are indifferent to labeling; they fail to recognize the
differences between domestic and imported goods. The authors assume that labeling will
increase the demand for products derived from the United States. However, this may not
occur. The opposite may be true. Consumers may prefer imported goods over the
domestic goods.
Furthermore, the cases that Krissoff et al. (2004) describe are basic and leave out
some pivotal concepts. The authors assume that producers face constant average and
marginal costs of production, which is a fairly strict assumption. This assumption allows
them to use a horizontal supply curve. However, by not using an upward sloping supply
curve, they are neglecting to demonstrate how the compliance costs are distributed
between consumers and producers. Also, they do not address the impacts the elasticities
of demand and supply have on the distributions of these costs.
While Krissoff et al. (2004) assume that the supply curve is horizontal, this
assumption is now relaxed to determine the impacts on producer and consumer surpluses
and cost shares. Additionally, several cases are explored that explain how the price
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elasticities of demand and supply can influence the welfare of producers and consumers.
For simplicity, assume that all consumers (including those that prefer labels and those
that are indifferent to labeling) can be represented by one demand curve. This aggregate
demand curve is the sum of individual demand curves.
Furthermore, assume that complying with COOL increases the marginal cost of
producing the covered commodity. The increase in marginal cost is equal to γ or ∆MC,
which is also the vertical supply curve shift. As previously discussed, COOL can impact
the demand for U.S. products. Let the vertical shift in demand be β, which can be either
positive, negative, or zero. The initial supply curve before the shift is
supply curve after the shift is
curve after the shift is

( ). The initial demand curve is

( ) and the
( ) and the demand

( ).

Prior to the implementation of COOL the market price is Po, which is determined
by the intersection of supply and demand (

( )

( )). The market price after the

implementation of COOL, PN, is determined by the intersection of the new supply and
demand curves (

( )

( )).

Using these points of intersection and the direct demand curves, consumer surplus,
can be computed to compare consumers’ well-being before and after the implementation
of COOL. Initial consumer surplus (CS1) is defined by

Eq. 3.8

∫

( )

Where PC is the choke price, the point where demand and supply intersect on the vertical
axis (Marshall, 1949). Following the implementation of COOL and the shift in supply or
demand or both, the new consumer surplus (CS2) is defined as
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Eq. 3.9

∫

( )

Where PC2 is the chock price after the shift, using the original and new consumer
surpluses, we can calculate the change is consumer surplus (∆CS).

Eq. 3.10

( )

∆CS = [∫

]
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[∫

]

Producer surplus can be computed to compare producers’ well-being before and
after the implementation of COOL. The producer surplus prior to the implementation of
COOL (PS1) is defined as follows (Marshall, 1949):

Eq.3.11

∫

( )

The producer surplus after the implementation of COOL (PS2) is:

Eq. 3.12

∫

( )

The change in producer surplus (∆PS) is defined as the new producer surplus minus the
old producer surplus.

Eq. 3.13

∫

( )

]

( )

∫
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Also, the compliance cost of COOL can be calculated (Note: this assumes that all
compliance costs are variable costs and none of the compliance costs are fixed costs).
The total compliance cost of COOL is γ multiplied by the new quantity demanded (Q2).

Eq. 3.14
Consumer and producer cost shares can also be calculated. When β < γ,
consumers’ cost can be calculated as the difference between the new price (PN) and the
old price (Po) multiplied by the new quantity (Q2).

Eq. 3.15

(
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Using Eq. 3.14 and Eq. 3.15 producers’ costs can be found by subtracting the consumers’
cost from the total compliance cost of COOL.

Eq. 3.16

(

)

((

)

)

The consumers cost share is computed by dividing consumers’ cost (Eq. 3.15) by the total
compliance cost (Eq. 3.14)
(

Eq. 3.17

)
γ

The producers’ cost share can be found by taking the consumers’ cost share (Eq. 3.17)
and subtracting it from one.
(

Eq. 3.18

)
γ

If β > γ, the consumers bear all the cost associated with COOL.
Using these equations the impacts of COOL on consumer and producer welfare
can easily be determined.
Clearly, the relative elasticities of supply and demand and the size of γ and β (size
of supply and demand shift) impacts consumer and producer welfare. To gain intuition,
several possible scenarios are considered graphically and the impacts on producer and
consumer welfare are determined. These cases include both the demand and supply
curves having the same slopes with the supply curve shifting inward, demand is more
elastic than supply with supply curve shifting inward, demand is more inelastic than
supply with the supply curve shifting inward, supply curve shifting inward and demand
curve shifting outward by the same amount, supply curve shifting inward is greater than
demand curve shifting outward (γ > β), demand curve shifting outward is greater than
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supply curve shifting inward (β > γ), and the final case consists of the demand curve
shifting inward while supply curve is also shifting inward. In each of these cases Krisoff
et al.’s assumption of the supply curve being horizontal has been relaxed.
In Figure 3.3 the supply curve is upward sloping and the slope of the supply curve
is the same absolute value as the slope of the demand curve. When COOL is
implemented, consumer and producer surpluses decline and the costs of implementing
country of origin labeling is split between the two groups (Consumer Cost Share=
Producer Cost Share). As shown in Figure 3.4, the original consumer surplus (CS1) was
area a+b+d+e, and the original producer surplus (PS1) was area f+g+c. After COOL was
implemented, the new consumer surplus (CS1) was area a and producer surplus (PS2) was
area c+b. The overall change in consumer surplus (∆CS) is –(b+d+e), which is negative.
The change in producer surplus is also negative (area b-f-g). Both consumers and
producers are worse off due to the implementation of COOL with the magnitude of the
change in welfare depending on the increase in marginal cost. Because of the additional
costs, supply will shift upward causing less to be supplied. This implies that the industry
may shrink as firms leave due to higher marginal costs.
In the next case, the supply curve is relatively more elastic than the demand curve.
This is portrayed in Figure 3.5. Again, the supply curve shifts to the left following the
implementation of COOL. Since the supply curve is upward sloping, the cost of labeling
is shared between consumers and producers. The exact producer and consumer cost
shares depend on the actual elasticities of supply and demand. In this scenario, the

53

consumers bear a greater share of the country of origin labeling cost burden (Cost Share
Consumer > Cost Share Producer).
Again, both consumer and producer surpluses decline and both groups are worse off with
COOL (∆CS and ∆PS are both negative), as displayed in Figure 3.6.
Figure 3.7 displays the case where the supply curve is relatively inelastic
compared to the demand curve. The supply curve shifts up by ∆MC or γ, because of
COOL compliance costs. This leads to a higher price and less of the product being
demanded. Consumer and producer surplus both decline (∆PS < 0 and ∆CS < 0) and
both groups are worse off (shown in Figure 3.8). The producers bear a higher share of
the costs of COOL (Producer cost share > Consumer cost share as shown in Figure 3.7).

Figure 3.3: Compliance Cost Shares when Slopes of Supply and Demand Have the
Same Absolute Value
In the next three cases the supply curve shifts by γ from S1 to S2 with the
implementation of COOL as in the previous cases. However, the demand curve also
shifts outward from D1 to D2 by β with the implementation of COOL because some
consumers prefer the domestic product and will increase their consumption of the
covered product following the implementation of COOL. The shift in demand could be
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driven by new consumers joining the market or previous consumers demanding more
after the implementation of COOL. However, in one of the cases the demand shifts
inward because consumers are assumed to prefer imported products to domestic products.

Figure 3.4: Consumer and Producer Surplus when Slopes of Supply and Demand
Have the Same Absolute Value

Figure 3.5: Compliance Cost Shares with Supply Relatively Elastic to Demand
Figure 3.9 demonstrates a scenario in which the demand and supply curves shift
by the same magnitude γ=β. Because the absolute values of the slopes of demand and
supply are equal and both the demand and supply curves shift by the same magnitudes,
Q1=Q2.
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Figure 3.6: Consumer and Producer Surplus with Supply Relatively Elastic to
Demand

Figure 3.7: Compliance Cost Shares with Supply Relatively Inelastic to Demand
Since the consumers are paying a higher price for the same quantity of the good, then
they bear all of the costs associated with COOL. Figure 3.10 conveys the producer
surplus and consumer surplus information. The changes in both producer surplus and
consumer surplus are zero.
In Figure 3.11, demand and supply shift such that γ > β. The absolute value of the
slopes of demand and supply are equal to each other. However, this does not have to be
the case, because the elasticities do not affect who bears the bigger share of COOL.
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Figure 3.8: Consumer and Producer Surplus with Supply Relatively Inelastic to
Demand

Figure 3.9: Compliance Cost Shares when γ = β

Figure 3.10: Consumer and Producer Surplus when γ = β
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Figure 3.11: Compliance Cost Shares when γ > β

Figure 3.12: Consumer and Producer Surplus when γ > β
Both consumer surplus and producer surplus decline (∆PS < 0 and ∆CS < 0) and hence
both producers and consumers are worse off. This is depicted in Figure 3.12. The
producers will bear less of the country of origins cost burden, while the consumers bear
most of the cost burden as shown in Figure 3.11
Figure 3.13 demonstrates the impacts on consumer surplus and producer surplus
when the supply and demand shifts such that γ < β. Again, the absolute value of the
slopes of demand and supply are equal to each other. However, this does not have to be
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the case, because the elasticities do not affect who bears the biggest share of COOL. The
consumers will bear all of the costs because demand increased by more than the cost of
COOL. In this case, producers will be better off (∆PS > 0) and the consumers will
become better off (CS > 0). This information is displayed in Figure 3.14.

Figure 3.13: Compliance Cost Shares when γ < β

Figure 3.14: Consumer and Producer Surplus when γ < β
In the final case, demand shifts inward because of country of origin labeling. The
supply curve shifts upward because of the increase in marginal costs. The demand shift
would occur if consumers switched to non-covered commodities or if consumers reduced
their consumption of domestic products and elected to purchase imported products. In
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this case, it is assumed that some consumers prefer the imported goods to the domestic
goods. This case Figure 3.15 depicts the supply and demand having the same absolute
slopes. The demand curve shifting inward (-β) would make both producers and
consumers worse off. So ∆PS and ∆CS would be negative as shown in Figure 3.16. The
party that would bear most of the cost of COOL would be determined by the elasticity of
the supply and demand curves and the size of the shift, the size of β.

Figure 3.15: Compliance Cost Shares when –β

Figure 3.16: Consumer and Producer Surplus when –β
In all the cases except the case when the supply and demand curve shift such that
γ < β, producers and consumers are worse off following the implementation of COOL.

60

Thus consumers’ preferences are very important in determining if COOL benefits
consumers and producers. The premiums that consumers place on products with
different origins can be explored by using an experimental auction like the BeckerDeGroot-Marschack mechanism.
The next chapter highlights how willingness to pay can be obtained using an
experimental auction. By eliciting willingness to pay for various types of shrimp,
consumers’ preferences of domestic products can be determined. In turn, these
preferences can be used to determine if consumers’ benefit from country of origin
labeling. The experimental auction technique can also be used to explore the impacts of
the shrimp’s other attributes on willingness to pay.
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Chapter 4: Experimental Methods
This chapter focuses on how the experimental data was collected. The data was
collected by performing an experiment using the Becker-Degroot-Marschak (BDM)
mechanism. This data collection method elicits consumers’ willingness to pay using the
expected utility framework. The experiment was divided into three parts. The first two
parts were designed to help familiarize the participants with the bidding process. In the
third and final part of the experiment, participants were asked to bid on five different
types of shrimp. The experiment data is used to estimate willingness to pay for each of
the five shrimp types, evaluate consumer’s preferences and analyze possible stigma
effects.
Overview
The experimental method used to elicit participants’ willingness to pay for shrimp
products was the Becker-Degroot-Marschak (BDM) method. The method was chosen
because it is incentive compatible with the expected utility framework and for its demand
revealing properties. The experiment consisted of several rounds in which subjects
formulate ―bids.‖
The experiment consisted of three parts. In each part of the experiment,
participants were given money for bidding. The first part consisted of five rounds in
which participants were asked to bid on known cash values. The next round consisted of
participants bidding on a Bic Round Stic pen. The first six rounds were practice rounds
designed to allow participants to learn how to correctly value items. In the last five
rounds, participants were asked to bid on five different types of shrimp.
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The revealed priced was used to determine if subjects ―purchased‖ the item being
bid on. The participant purchased the item when the participant’s bid was higher than the
price generated from the random number table. If the item was purchased, then the
bidder paid the randomly determined price and received the item, along with the
remaining balance. The remaining balance was calculated as the initial amount of money
given to the participant for biding minus the price paid for the item. If the item was not
purchased, the bidder did not receive the item and did not have to pay the price.
Therefore, bidders not purchasing the item simply earned the initial amount received for
bidding.
Revealed prices were determined by having a subject drop a pen on a random
number table. The tables for the first five rounds contained values from zero to five
dollars. The next round used a random number table with values from zero to fifty cents.
In the final five rounds, the price for the shrimp, was determined by a random number
table with values ranging from zero to twenty dollars. All random number tables were in
penny increments.
Recruitment
The bylaws of Clemson University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) required
that human subjects approval be obtained prior to beginning the experiment. Once the
IRB had approved the experiment, the recruitment process began. A majority of the
recruitment was conducted via email; emails were sent to the faculty and staff of the
College of Agriculture, Forestry, and Life Sciences, the College of Architecture, Arts,
and Humanities, the College of Business and Behavioral Science, and the College of
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Engineering and Science at Clemson University using their list servs. The emails sent to
these employees were entitled ―Household Decision Making Study.‖ This title was
chosen so that the sample would not be biased; the goal was to obtain a representative
sample of the target population and not just consumers that liked shrimp. The email
announced that there was an economic incentive to participate and stated that on average
a participant would earn twenty-five dollars.

Graduate student organizations received a

similar email. The Graduate Student Senate was also given handouts containing similar
information regarding the study. Potential participants were instructed to email Addison
Ellis with the times that they were available to attend the scheduled experiment sessions.
As potential subjects responded to the advertisements, they were put into sessions
of ten participants per session. Participants were informed of the time and date of the
session they were scheduled for via email. The day before the experiment session was
scheduled to take place, the scheduled participants received a reminder email. The email
was entitled ―Reminder Household Decision Making Study Tomorrow at XXpm‖ (see
Appendix 1). The email was sent blind carbon copied (bcc) to the participants to
maintain the anonymity of the other participants and to prevent participants from
communicating with each other before or after the experiment.
Experiment Sessions
All the experiment sessions took place at 12 pm or 5 pm in Barre Hall located on
Clemson University’s campus. The experiment took place in a computer lab on the
second floor of Barre Hall, which contained ten participants’ computers. The computers
were connected to a server that allowed the ten computers to communicate with the

64

administrator’s computer, which was located in the front of the room. The
administrator’s computer was connected to a large television screen in the front of the
room which allowed the administrators to explain certain parts of the experiment and
display screens to the participants.
Some sessions took place at 5pm, which was after the building was locked. In
this case, an administrator was placed strategically at a specific door so that participants
could be let in to the building. Signs were placed on the other doors of the building
directing the participants to the appropriate door. Once participants entered the building
they were directed by signs to the correct room.
Upon entering the room, the subjects were asked to draw a ping pong ball out a
hat. Each ping pong ball had a number on it that corresponded to a specific computer.
The computers and ping pong balls were each numbered one through ten. Participants
were asked to sit at the computers corresponding with the balls that they drew to
randomize the seating assignment. Once seated, participants were asked to complete the
consent form and to begin reading the instructions. Participant instructions can be found
in Appendix 2. Individuals over 18 years old that were a Clemson University graduate
student, faculty member or staff, or local community member were allowed to participate.
Individuals that were undergraduate students were not allowed to participate. Once all
participants had arrived at the session or the time the experiment was scheduled to begin
had passed, the door to the computer lab was shut and the experiment began. Individuals
arriving late were not allowed to participate.
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Once the computer lab door was closed, the participants were given some
additional time to finish reading the instructions. The administrator then read the first
section of the instructions aloud to the participants. Before reading the instructions aloud,
participants were asked not to communicate with each other during the experiment and to
hold their questions until the end of the reading of the instructions.
After reading the first part of the instructions, the administrators instructed the
participants to enter an identification number (ID#) into the computer. This number was
made up of the month, date, time of the session, and computer number. The ID# was
used to link survey data with bidding data and to keep all information anonymous. Once
participants had entered their ID# they were asked to click the ―Start Experiment‖ button
on their computer screen. The administrator’s screen showed which participants had
entered the experiment. This information was displayed on the television screen at the
front of the room. Once all the participants had successfully entered the experiment, the
administrators began the experiment.
Cash Value Rounds (Rounds 1-5)
In the first five rounds, the participants were asked to decide the maximum value
that they would pay for a known cash value. The cash value could be thought as an
envelope full of money. The subjects were asked to determine the highest amount they
would pay to receive their cash value. The cash values were randomly assigned and
varied throughout the rounds of the experiment and across participants. The possible
cash values were $1, $2.50, and $4. The instructors stated that participants could earn the
most money if they entered bids equal to their cash values. These first five rounds were
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designed allow participants to learn the bidding process and to teach participants how to
correctly value items when the value was known.
Upon beginning the experiment, the participants’ computer screens displayed
their cash value, accumulated cash earnings (which changed from round to round), and
the amount of many available for bidding. These items were displayed on separate lines.
The last line on the screen restated the cash value and also contained a text box where
participants could enter their bid ranging from zero to five dollars in standard dollar
notation.
The participants were asked to enter the maximum value that they were willing to
pay for their cash value (their bids) using their computers. When the participants entered
their bid a green box appeared next to the participants ID# on the administrator’s screen
in the front of the room, while a red box appeared next to the ID# of those participants
that had not bid yet. This allowed the administrators to determine who had not bid and if
participants were having problems with the bidding system. Once all participants had
submitted a bid, then the price was determined.
The price was determined by having a volunteer subject come to the front of the
room and drop a pen on a random number table. The random number table had numbers
ranging from zero to five dollars in penny increments. The price was determined by
where the pen landed and marked the random number table. The administrator then read
the price aloud for the participants to hear and held the table up for them to see. By
having a subject drop a pen on a random number table, prices were determined randomly
making the method incentive compatible. Almost every participant had an opportunity to
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determine the price during the experiment. After the price was determined, the
administrator then entered the price in the administrator’s computer and asked the
participants to click the button on their computer’s to continue.
Upon continuation, participants were asked to direct their attention to the large
screen in the front of the room which showed the subjects’ bids and cash values.
Participant ID# were not displayed to ensure anonymity. The screen displayed a table
with each participant having their own row in the table and the columns displayed the
following information: cash value, bid, price, purchased (y/n), round earnings, initial
balance, and total earnings. The administrators then asked the participants if they could
identify their bids and cash values. By identifying their cash values and corresponding
bids, participants could determine whether they purchased the item (their cash value) or
not, the amount they earned in the round, and their total earnings from the round. Each
row of the table was explained to teach participants how the bid, price, round earnings,
and total earnings interacted.
If a participant’s bid exceeded the price, then the participant purchased their cash
value and the subject had to pay the randomly determined price for his/her cash value. If
the item was purchased, the participant’s round earnings were calculated by subtracting
the price from the cash value. This number could be positive or negative depending of the
subject’s cash value and the price. If the participant’s bid was less than the randomly
determined price, then the cash value was not purchased. The participants who did not
purchase their cash values earned nothing in the round.

The calculation of total earnings

for the round took into account the participants initial balance. Essentially, total earnings
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for the round were calculated by adding the initial cash balance of five dollars that was
received for bidding to the participants round earnings. It was possible for a subject to
earn fewer than five dollars in a round if they purchased their cash value for a price that
was higher than their cash value.
After all the bids had been discussed, a screen appeared on the participant’s
computer that summarized the round. The screen displayed his/her cash value, his/her
bid, the price of the item, and then summarized the calculation of his/her round earnings.
The accumulated cash earnings from the previous rounds were also displayed. After
participants were satisfied with viewing the information on the screen, they could
continue to the next round and place their bids.
Rounds 2, 3, 4, and 5 were all conducted in the same manner as round 1 with the
exception that a different individual dropped the pen each time on the random number
table. After each round, the results were explained by the administrators.
At the end of the fifth round, each participant was shown a screen on his/her
computer displaying his/her accumulated earnings in experimental dollars and a 1/4th
conversion factor was applied to transform the winnings to US dollars. The experimental
design is summarized in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1: Experimental Set-Up
Part

Items For Sale

Initial
Balance

Range
of Costs

Bids
Per
Round

Cash
Payoff
Rounds

Exchange
Rate

Practice
Rounds

Cash Values

$5

$0$5.00

1

5

4:1

$1, $2.50, $4

Pen
Round

Pen

$.50

$0-$.50

1

1

1:1

Shrimp
Rounds

Imported Farm
Raised

$20.00

$0$20.00

1

1

1:1

USA Farm Raised
Gulf Coast fresh
caught
Non-Gulf Coast
Non-NC/SC fresh
catch (U.S. fresh
catch
NC/SC Coast
fresh catch

Pen Round (Round 6)
Before beginning the ―Pen as the Purchase Decision‖ round, the participants were
read the instructions corresponding to this part of the experiment. In this round,
participants were asked to bid on a Bic Round Stic pen that wrote black and had a gray
exterior. Participants were given fifty cents for the round and there was no conversion
factor from experimental dollar to US dollars. In this round, participants were asked to
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determine the maximum amount of money that they were willing to pay for the pen. Bids
could range from zero to fifty cents.
The price was determined by having a participant drop a pen on a random number
table that contained values from zero to fifty in one cent increments. After a volunteer
subject dropped a pen on the random number table the price was read aloud. After the
price was entered in the administrator’s computer, each participant viewed a screen on
his/her computer that displayed the price of the pen, his/her bid, and whether or not
he/she purchased the pen.
The subject purchased the pen if their bid exceeded the randomly determined
price. In this case, the person received the pen but had to pay the randomly determined
price. They also received the remaining balance after paying the price. The subject
received the remaining balance of fifty cents minus the price. Alternatively, if the price
was less than the bid, the subject did not purchase the pen. In this case, the subject did
not receive the pen and got to keep the fifty cents. As each participant viewed summary
screen, pens were distributed to the people that had purchased the pens. Table 4.1
summarizes this round.
Shrimp Rounds (Rounds 7-11)
The final five rounds of the experiment consisted of participants bidding on five
types of shrimp. These shrimp types were as follows: 1) Gulf Coast Fresh Caught 2)
North Carolina/South Carolina Coast Fresh Caught (Local), 3) United States Farm Raised
(USA Farm Raised), 4) Thailand Farm Raised, and 5) United States Fresh Caught (Non
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North Carolina/South Carolina Coast, Non Gulf Coast). The last shrimp was actually
from Alaska, but by using that title the origin of the shrimp was not disclosed.
The Gulf Coast fresh caught shrimp was chosen to test for stigma resulting from
the 2010 BP Gulf of Mexico oil spill. It was purchased from Billy’s Seafood in Louisiana
and arrived via FedEx. The North Carolina/South Carolina Coast fresh caught shrimp
was selected to test for a local effect because of South Carolina’s ―SC Grown‖ initiative.
This product was purchased at a local Ingles store. United States farm raised shrimp was
purchased from Green Prairie Shrimp in Louisiana and arrived via FedEx. This product
was selected because it was farm raised and from the United States thus allowing
comparisons against the United States fresh caught varieties and the imported farm raised
shrimp. The Thailand farm raised shrimp was selected because Thailand is the leading
exporter of shrimp to the United States and the product is readily available in most U.S.
supermarkets (USDA, 2011). Because of the availability, this type of shrimp was
purchased at a local Bi-Lo store. The last type of shrimp, Non North Carolina/South
Carolina Coast, Non Gulf Coast, United States Fresh Caught (USA fresh caught) was
purchased from Great Alaska Seafood. It was selected because of its neutral location and
hence could be used as the benchmark against which to test the various effects. To
eliminate any unforeseen preference for Alaskan products, participants were not informed
that this product was from Alaska. Great Alaska Seafood shipped the shrimp overnight
through FedEx. All the shrimp that was purchased for the experiment was shell-on
headless shrimp. Only the Thailand shrimp was deveined.
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Before this part of the experiment began, the instructions were read aloud and
participants were given the opportunity to ask questions. Each participant was then given
a one page handout with facts on country-of-origin labeling, the two shrimp production
processes (fresh catch and farm raised) and the 2010 British Petroleum (BP) oil spill that
occurred in the Gulf of Mexico off the coast of Louisiana (Appendix 3). The participants
were then given ample time to read this sheet. At this point, the administrators asked if
anyone had a severe seafood allergy and gave those individuals the opportunity to leave
the room. None of the participants had an allergy severe enough to require them to leave
the experiment.
After reading the handout, every participant was given a tray with five different
compartments. Each compartment of the tray was numbered in a clockwise manner and
each compartment contained a different shrimp type. The shrimp had been boiled in
water for seven minutes in order for the subjects to be able to taste the shrimp. The
participants were also given a shrimp identification sheet that related the types of shrimp
to the number of each labeled compartment. Each session the shrimp types were placed
in different compartments. In a recent study Kanter, Messer and Kaiser (2008) found that
bids depend on the order in which items were presented thus we randomized the
numbering of shrimp types to control for this potential effect. The order was determined
by a random number generator.
Participants were asked to complete a shrimp tasting booklet. This booklet
consisted of five pages (one for each type of shrimp). Participants were asked to rate the
different attributes (size, smell, appearance, and taste) of the shrimp compared to their
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ideal shrimp on a Likert scale. The Likert scale ranged from one to nine with one being
the least ideal and nine being the most ideal (see Appendix 4). Participants were not
required to taste the shrimp. Participants who did not taste the shrimp were asked to
indicate this. Once the participants had finished rating the different characteristics and
attributes of each shrimp, the bidding process began.
Participants were told that after they submitted their bids for the five types of
shrimp, they would find out which product and corresponding bid would be used to
determine their final payout. This selection was done randomly with each type of shrimp
being equally likely. Since participants did not know which type of shrimp was available
for purchase and hence would be used to calculate earnings, this ensured that subjects bid
their true willingness to pay for each shrimp type. Before the session began, information
regarding the type of shrimp available for purchase for that session was placed in a sealed
envelope. In each of the five shrimp rounds, the participants received twenty dollars for
bidding. There was no conversion factor in this round. Participants were allowed to
enter bids ranging from zero to twenty dollars in penny increments. This is summarized
in Table 4.1.
The five shrimp rounds corresponded to the five types of shrimp listed on the
identification sheet. During each round the administrator would read the type of shrimp
that was being bid on so the participants would not mistake the types of shrimp.
Participants were asked to bid the highest amount of money that they would pay for a half
pound of that type of shrimp. The administrators made it clear that the shrimp was raw
and frozen and could be picked up at the end of the day or pick-up on a future date if they
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had plans after work/class or it could be delivered to their office at the end of the day.
Once all the bids had been placed, the envelope containing the type of shrimp that was
actually available for purchase was opened and this information was entered in the
computer.
The price was determined in the same manner as the previous rounds, by having a
participant drop a pen on a random number table. This time the table contained values
from zero to twenty dollars in penny increments. The shrimp was purchased if the bid
was greater than the price, and the shrimp was not purchased if the price was higher than
the bid. In the event that the shrimp was purchased, the participant received the shrimp
but had to pay the randomly determined price and received the remaining balance. In the
event that the shrimp was not purchased, the subject did not receive the shrimp and did
not have to pay the price so earnings for the round was the initial balance of twenty
dollars.
After the price had been determined and entered into the administrator’s computer,
participants viewed a computer screen that showed their earnings from the first five
rounds, the pen round, and the shrimp rounds. They could also see if they purchased the
pen or the shrimp. While the participants looked at their screens, the administrators
passed out a final questionnaire (See Appendix 5). This survey contained questions
regarding shrimp purchasing behavior and demographics. Participants were asked
questions pertaining to their hungriness, the time of their last meal before the experiment,
their consumption behavior regarding seafood and shrimp, , their affiliation with
Clemson University, state of residence, if they were primary purchaser, knowledge of
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COOL and shrimp processes, and level of education. Participants were also asked about
their household size, number of children, income, and how often they purchased the
different types of shrimp. Once participants had finished the survey they were asked to
complete a receipt stating they got paid and the amount. After completing the receipt and
being handed their money, participants were free to leave and thanked for participating.
The data collected in this experiment was used to determine the attributes that
influenced consumers’ willingness to pay for shrimp. The selection criteria of the
specific types of shrimp allowed the experimental data to be used to test if stigma exists
on shrimp from the Gulf of Mexico and if stigma is present on farm raised shrimp. By
comparing consumer preferences for domestic versus imported shrimp, consumers’
preferences for COOL are revealed. Furthermore, the experimental design allows for
testing of the ―SC Grown‖ initiative and if consumers are willing to pay a premium for
local products.
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Chapter 5: Experimental Results
In this chapter, I discuss the experimental results. The experiment was conducted
over a three week period during October and November of 2010 at Clemson University.
Sessions were held at 12pm (Monday-Friday) and 5pm (Monday-Thursday) in Barre Hall
on Clemson University’s campus. The experimental results provide evidence of
consumers’ preferences for local products, U.S. products and production processes, and
evidence of stigma.
Participant Characteristics
Table 5.1 summarizes the characteristics of the 110 individuals who participated
in the study. The majority of the participants were female (58 percent). The mean age of
the participants was 38 years old; the oldest subject was 72 years old, while the youngest
was 21 years old. The standard deviation of age was 14 years. The mean household size
of the participants was 2.36, with an average of 0.5 children per household.

The sample

was evenly divided with 50 percent having children. The highest number of children in a
household was four. A majority of the participants were affiliated with Clemson
University; the sample consisted of 38 percent staff, 31 percent graduate students, 15
percent faculty, 2 percent visiting scholars and 14 percent of the participants were
community members not affiliated with the university. The minority of participants
claimed their primary residence as South Carolina with only 45 percent residing in the
state full-time. Eighty percent of the participants were United States of American citizens.
Eighty-one percent of the subjects considered themselves the primary purchaser for their
household.
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Table 5.1: Participant Characteristics
Participant Characteristics
Frequency
Female
64
Male
46
Non-South Carolina Resident
61
South Carolina Resident
49
Clemson University Graduate Student
34
Clemson University Staff
42
Clemson University Faculty
17
Other Clemson University Affiliation
2
No Affiliation with Clemson University
15
Non-United States Citizen
22
United States Citizen
88
Primary Purchasers
89
Non-Primary Purchasers
21

Percent
58.18
41.82
55.45
44.55
30.91
38.18
15.45
1.82
13.64
20
80
80.91
19.09

Since some consumers may consider shrimp a luxury good and hence income
levels are likely to influence willingness to pay, respondents were asked to report their
income. The subjects’ responses are summarized in Table 5.2. Two percent of the
participants chose not to respond to this question. As shown in the table, many of the
respondents have income levels falling into the lower brackets. This is because the
majority of the participants were graduate students or staff and these groups tend to have
lower income levels than faculty members.
Participants were also asked about their highest level of education. A
participant’s level of education might be correlated with knowledge about the shrimp
production processes and COOL. A majority of the participants had either bachelor’s
degrees or advanced degrees; only two percent of the participants indicated not
graduating high school (Table 5.3).
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Table 5. 2: Income Distribution
Number of Percent
Income Level
Responses
(%)
Prefer not to Respond
0-$10,000
$10,000-$20,000
$20,000-$30,000
$30,000-$40,000
$40,000-$50,000
$50,000-$60,000
$60,000-$70,000
$70,000-$80,000
$80,000-$90,000
$90,000-$100,000
$100,000-$110,000
$110,000-$120,000
$120,000-$130,000
$130,000-$140,000
$140,000-$150,000
Over $150,000

2
10
16
9
15
10
11
7
8
6
5
1
1
2
2
3
2

1.82
9.09
14.55
8.18
13.64
9.09
10
6.36
7.27
5.45
4.55
0.91
0.91
1.82
1.82
2.73
1.82

Table 5.3: Participants Education Status
School Completed
Frequency
Percent
High School
3
2.73
Some College
9
8.18
Associates’ Degree
7
6.36
Bachelor’s Degree
37
33.64
Advanced Degree
54
49.09
The participants were also asked to gauge how hungry they were when taking part
in the experiment. Participants were ask to rate their hungriness on a likert scale ranging
from one to nine with one being least hungry and nine being most hungry. The mean
hungriness was 3.9. Participants were also asked to disclose the last time that they
consumed food. The mean time that subjects last consumed food was 4.8 hours before
the experiment (Table 5.4).
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Variable

5.4: Additional Participant Characteristics
Number of
Standard
Responses Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum

Last Ate (Hours Ago)
How Hungry
Meals of Seafood
Meals of Shrimp
Age
Number of Children
Household Size

110
110
110
110
110
110
110

4.764
3.909
4.464
1.914
38.182
0.500
2.364

9.718
2.297
4.021
2.428
13.961
0.829
1.198

0.010
1.000
0.000
0.000
21.000
0.000
1.000

96.000
9.000
25.000
16.000
72.000
4.000
6.000

Shrimp Purchasing Behaviors
The participants in the experiment consumed on average 4.5 meals of seafood a
month. On average, two of those meals consisted of shrimp products. This data is
summarized in Table 5.4. Of the participants who consumed zero meals of shrimp per
month 34 percent claimed that shrimp was too expensive, 14 percent were
vegetarians/vegans, 20 percent did not like shrimp, and 32 percent had other reasons that
they did not consume shrimp. This data is displayed in Table 5.5. Only one participant
indicated not purchasing shrimp because he/she was allergic to seafood.
Table 5.5: Reason for Not Consuming Shrimp
Reason
Frequency
Percent
Too Expensive
15
34.09
Vegetarian/Vegan
6
13.64
Did not like Shrimp
9
20.45
Other Reason
14
31.82
The participants were asked a series of questions to determine their shrimp
purchasing behaviors (Table 5.6). The results indicated that some subjects prefer farm
raised shrimp, while others prefer fresh caught shrimp. Collectively, it appears that the
participants preferred fresh caught shrimp to farm raised products. Perhaps preferences
for the fresh caught products are due to negative publicity surrounding farm raised
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shrimp, which has led farm raised products becoming stigmatized. Sixty-nine percent of
participants had previous knowledge of the shrimp production processes; however, only
55 percent had previous knowledge of country of origin labeling.
Table 5.6: Participant Purchasing Characteristics
Shrimp Purchasing Behavior
Number of Respondents
Never Purchases
Fresh Caught Shrimp
Farm Raised Shrimp
Rarely Purchases
Fresh Caught Shrimp
Farm Raised Shrimp
Sometimes Purchases
Fresh Caught Shrimp
Farm Raised Shrimp
Often Purchases
Fresh Caught Shrimp
Farm Raised Shrimp
Always Purchases
Fresh Caught Shrimp
Farm Raised Shrimp
Don't Know what I purchase
Fresh Caught Shrimp
Farm Raised Shrimp
No Response
Fresh Caught Shrimp
Farm Raised Shrimp

Percent

19
30

17.27
27.27

34
33

30.91
30

38
37

34.55
33.64

13
5

11.82
4.55

3
1

2.73
0.91

2
3

1.82
2.73

1
1

0.91
0.91

Perceived Risks of Shrimp Consumption
To determine if the participants’ preferences for the fresh caught product are due
to stigma surrounding farm raised shrimp, participants were ask to rate how risky they
viewed the consumption of the various types of shrimp on a scale of 1 to 9. The scale
was set up such that 1 was the least risky and 9 was the most risky. In addition, they were
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asked to rate their level of concern associated with consuming various types of shrimp.
The results are presented in Table 5.7.
Table 5.7: Shrimp Consumption Assessment
View
Mean
Standard Deviation
Concerned About Consumption
Gulf Coast Shrimp

4.582

2.717

Imported Shrimp

5.636

2.772

Farm Raised Shrimp

4.318

2.541

Fresh Caught Shrimp

3.636

2.594

Gulf Coast Shrimp

5.036

2.598

Imported Shrimp

5.527

2.463

Farm Raised Shrimp

4.164

2.414

Fresh Caught Shrimp

3.082

1.964

Risk associated with Consuming

Participants were the least concerned about consuming fresh caught shrimp with a
mean rating of 3.63. Participants also rated the consumption of fresh caught shrimp as
the least risky with a rating of 3.08. The participants’ ratings of fresh caught shrimp as
the least risky imply that participants might have preferences for fresh caught products.
Perhaps the participants view fresh caught as a safer process because no chemicals are
used. Furthermore, the results imply that participants may be willing to pay more for
local products since South Carolina shrimp is fresh caught. Moreover, most fresh caught
shrimp sold in the US are U.S. products thus consumers may be willing to pay a premium
for domestic products because they are produced using the fresh caught process.
Participants also have concerns regarding the consumption of imported shrimp
with a mean rating 5.64; they viewed imported shrimp as the most risky to consume with
a mean of 5.53. Perhaps the participants feel that the production processes used in other
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countries or the safety standards in other countries are not adequate. These results
suggest that COOL may influence consumers’ purchasing decisions.
Participants viewed shrimp from the Gulf of Mexico as the second most risky
type of shrimp to consume with a rating of 5.04. Also, participants were concerned about
consuming Gulf Coast shrimp; it received the second highest mean rating with a rating of
4.58. This shows evidence of a stigma being attached to Gulf Coast products. Consumers
appear to be associating negative attributes with shrimp from this region. However, at
the time of the experiment, shrimp from the Gulf of Mexico had been declared safe for
human consumption.
The mean rating for the Gulf Coast was significantly different from mean ratings
for imported and fresh caught products. Also, the mean rating for imported shrimp was
significantly different then farm (Table 5.8). The participants rating for the riskiness of
consuming fresh caught shrimp was significantly different from the ratings of the other
types of shrimp. While the rating of the riskiness of consuming farm raised shrimp was
different from the ratings for imported and Gulf of Mexico shrimp (Table 5.9).
Evaluation of Shrimp Attributes
In addition, participants were asked to evaluate the size, smell, appearance and
taste of each type of shrimp that they bid on. The attributes were rated on a 10 point
likert scale. The participants were asked to compare each shrimp to their perceived ideal
shrimp. A rating of 1 meant that the shrimp was not ideal while a rating of 10 meant that
the shrimp’s attribute was ideal. The results are summarized in Table 5.10.

83

Table 5.8: Concerned Means Significant Differences

i/j

Gulf Coast Imported Farm Raised Fresh Catch

Gulf Coast

-2.8494
(0.0048)

Imported

2.8494
(0.0048)

Farm
Raised

-0.7432
(0.4582)

-3.6765
(0.0003)

Fresh
Catch

-2.6396
(0.0089)

-5.5254
<.0001

0.7432
(0.4582)

2.6396
(0.0089)

3.6765
(0.0003)

5.5254
<.0001
1.9693
(0.0503)

-1.9693
(0.0503)

Table 5.9: Riskiness Means Significant Differences

i/j

Gulf Coast Imported Farm Raised Fresh Catch

Gulf
Coast

-1.4380
(0.1519)

Imported

1.4380
(0.1519)

Farm
Raised

-2.5810
(0.0105)

-4.1469
(<.0001)

Fresh
Catch

-6.2944
(<.0001)

8.1418
(<.0001)
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2.5810
(0.0105)

6.2944
(<.0001)

4.1469
(<.0001)

8.1418
(<.0001)
3.6465
(0.0003)

-3.6465
(0.0003)

Table 5.10: Summary Statistics from the Experiment
Number of
Standard
Statistic
Observations
Mean
Deviation
Size
550
US Fresh Catch
110
7.67
2.06
Gulf Coast
110
8.02
2.16
United States Farm Raised
110
6.74
2.21
Thailand
110
5.49
2.37
Local
110
7.60
2.07
Appearance
550
US Fresh Catch
110
5.51
2.57
Gulf Coast
110
7.72
2.14
United States Farm Raised
110
6.45
2.38
Thailand
110
7.24
2.12
Local
110
7.07
2.55
Smell
550
US Fresh Catch
110
6.35
2.45
Gulf Coast
110
6.69
2.46
United States Farm Raised
110
6.05
2.21
Thailand
110
6.36
2.43
Local
110
6.61
2.47
Taste
416
US Fresh Catch
86
6.84
2.43
Gulf Coast
84
7.65
2.06
United States Farm Raised
82
4.05
2.66
Thailand
78
5.99
2.58
Local
86
5.55
2.56
The participants rated the Gulf Coast fresh caught shrimp as having the best size
with a mean of 8.02, while the farm raised Thailand shrimp had the least desirable size
with a mean of 5.72. The second highest rated shrimp was USA Fresh Catch product
with a size rating of 7.67, followed closely by the local shrimp having a mean rating of
7.60. The second lowest rated, United States farm raised product, had a mean of 6.74.
Although there is no significant difference between the size ratings for the Gulf Coast,
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USA Fresh Catch and local products, the ratings for the USA farm raised and Thailand
products were significantly different from the size ratings for all other products (See
Table 5.11). While effort was taken to ensure that the five types of shrimp were similar in
terms of appearance and size, size differences across the types of shrimp can be attributed
to the kinds of shrimp that live in various regions of the ocean. Also, the count (a number
used to denote the number of shrimp per pound) is a size range. We used 21-25 count for
our experiment, so some participants received smaller shrimp, while others received
larger shrimp. Furthermore, different participants may prefer different sizes of shrimp.
Table 5.11: Size Means Significant Differences
i/j

Gulf Coast

Gulf
Coast

Local

Thailand

USA Farm

US Fresh
Catch

1.4250
(0.1547)

8.6120
(<.0001)

4.3679
(<.0001)

1.17717
(0.2396)

7.1870
(<.0001)

2.9429
(0.0034)

-0.2478
(0.8044)

-4.2440
(<.0001)

-7.4348
(<.0001)

Local

-1.4250
(0.1547)

Thailand

-8.6120
(<.0001)

-7.1870
(<.0001)

USA
Farm

-4.3679
<.0001

-2.9429
(0.0034)

4.2440
<.0001

-3.1908
(0.0015)

US Fresh
-1.1772
0.2478
7.4348
3.1908
Catch
(0.2396)
(0.8044)
(<.0001)
(0.0015)
Note: H0: LSMean(i)=LSMean(j), t-statistics are reported with corresponding p-values in
parenthesis.

The participants rated the Gulf Coast shrimp as having the best appearance with a
mean rating of 7.72. A close second was the Thailand shrimp with a 7.24 mean rating.
Thailand shrimp was followed by local shrimp with a mean rating of 7.07. There is no
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statistical difference between the mean appearance rating of the Gulf Coast shrimp and
the Thailand shrimp (see Table 5.12). The participants rated the USA Fresh Catch shrimp
as having the worst appearance with a mean rating of 5.51. The United States farm raised
shrimp was rated the second worst with a mean rating of 6.45. The mean appearance
rating of the Gulf Coast shrimp was significantly different from ratings of the local, USA
farm raised and USA Fresh Catch products. The mean appearance ratings of the local and
USA farm raised products were significantly different from the mean appearance ratings
of all the other shrimp types. Each shrimp type was a different species and came from a
different location. Hence, each type of shrimp was a slightly different color. The USA
Fresh Catch shrimp had a deep red hue. Most people think of the ideal shrimp as being a
pink color and not red, which might have influenced the ratings. Also, the U.S. farm
raised shrimp appeared to be molting; their shells were lose and often too big. This
natural occurrence in the life cycle may have influenced the participants’ perceptions and
ratings.
The subjects also rated the smell of each type of shrimp. They rated the Gulf
Coast shrimp as having the most appealing scent with a mean rating of 6.69, which was
significantly higher than the ratings for the other four types. The next best smelling
shrimp was the local shrimp with a rating of 6.61. The next two types of shrimp, USA
Fresh Catch and Thailand, had similar ratings with mean scores of 6.35 and 6.36,
respectively. The most unpleasant scented shrimp was the United States farm raised
shrimp earning a mean rating of 6.05; however, there was no significant difference
between the ratings for the second most appealing and least appealing (See Table 5.13).
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The close vicinity of the shrimp to each other on the tasting tray made it difficult to
differentiate the individual smells.
Table 5.12: Appearance Means Significant Differences
i/j

Gulf Coast

Gulf
Coast

Local

Thailand

USA Farm

US Fresh
Catch

2.0261
(0.0432)

1.5124
(0.131)

3.9950
(<.0001)

6.93425
(<.0001)

-0.5137
(0.6077)

1.9690
(0.0495)

4.9082
(<.0001)

2.4826
(0.0133)

5.4218
(<.0001)

Local

-2.0261
(0.0432)

Thailand

-1.5124
(0.131)

0.5136
(0.6077)

USA
Farm

-3.9950
(<.0001)

-1.9690
(0.0495)

-2.4826
(0.0133)

2.9392
(0.0034)

US Fresh
-6.9343
-4.9082
-5.4218
-2.9392
Catch
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
0.00340
Note: H0: LSMean(i)=LSMean(j), t-statistics are reported with corresponding p-values in
parenthesis.

After rating the physical attributes, participants were asked to rate the taste of
each type of shrimp relative to their ideal shrimp. The best tasting shrimp was the Gulf
Coast product with a mean rating of 7.65, which was almost one point higher than the
ratings of the other types and significantly different from the four other types. The USA
Fresh Catch shrimp was rated the second best tasting with a mean of 6.84, which was
significantly different from the rating for the USA farm raised product. The local and
Thailand shrimp types had similar mean ratings of 5.55 and 5.99, respectively. The
lowest rated shrimp in terms of taste was the USA farm raised product with a mean of
4.05. The tasted of the USA farm raised product was rated significantly lower than the
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four other types. This data is summarized in table 5.14. Differences in taste can be
attributed to the different shrimp species, location of harvest and method of rearing.
Table 5.13: Smell Means Significant Differences
i/j

Gulf Coast

Gulf
Coast

Local

Thailand

USA Farm

US Fresh
Catch

0.252108
(0.8011)

1.008432
(0.3137)

1.988851
(0.0472)

1.036444
(0.3005)

0.756324
(0.4498)

1.736743
(0.083)

0.784336
(0.4332)

0.98042
(0.3273)

0.028012
(0.9777)

Local

-0.25211
(0.8011)

Thailand

-1.00843
(0.3137)

-0.75632
(0.4498)

USA
Farm

-1.98885
(0.0472)

-1.73674
(0.083)

-0.98042
(0.3273)

US Fresh
Catch

-1.03644
(0.3005)

-0.78434
(0.4332)

-0.02801
(0.9777)

-0.95241
(0.3413)
0.952408
(0.3413)

Note: H0: LSMean(i)=LSMean(j), t-statistics are reported with corresponding p-values in
parenthesis.
Willingness to Pay
After rating and tasting the shrimp, participants were asked to bid on a half pound
of each type of shrimp. Since the BDM method is incentive compatible, the participants’
bids should reflect their true willingness to pay. Willingness to pay (Bid) information for
the five types of shrimp is summarized in table 5.15. The Gulf Coast shrimp was rated the
highest in every attribute; therefore, it was expected that it would also have the highest
mean Bid because participants indicated that they preferred the Gulf Coast shrimp’s
attributes to attributes of the five other types. However, the highest willingness to pay
was for the USA Fresh Catch product. Thus, there is evidence of stigma associated with
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Gulf Coast products. The USA Fresh Catch fresh caught shrimp was rated the second
highest in most of the attribute categories (it was rated the lowest for appearance);
however, participants were willing to pay twenty cents more for the U.S. fresh caught
shrimp than the Gulf Coast product. The mean Bid for a half pound of frozen raw Gulf
Coast was $7.16, while the mean Bid for the USA Fresh Catch shrimp was $7.36.

i/j

Table 5.14: Taste Means Significant Differences
Gulf Coast
Local
Thailand
USA Farm

5.57921
(<.0001)

Gulf
Coast
Local

-5.57921
<.0001

Thailand

-4.28874
(<.0001)

1.160765
(0.2464)

USA
Farm

-9.41385
(<.0001)

-3.92328
(0.0001)

US Fresh
Catch

4.288745
(<.0001)

9.413847
(<.0001)

2.123783
(0.0343)

-1.16076
(0.2464)

3.923284
(0.0001)

-3.37403
(0.0008)

4.976151
(<.0001)

-2.15301
(0.0319)

-4.97615
(<.0001)

-7.18844
(<.0001)

-2.12378
3.374027
2.15301
7.188441
US Fresh
(0.0343)
(0.0008)
(0.0319)
(<.0001)
Catch
Note: H0: LSMean(i)=LSMean(j), t-statistics are reported with corresponding p-values
in parenthesis.

Table 5.15: Participants Bids for Shrimp Rounds
Number of
Statistic
Observations
Mean
Bid
550
US Fresh Catch
110
7.36
Gulf Coast
110
7.16
United States Farm Raised
110
5.61
Thailand
110
5.72
Local
110
7.04
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Standard
Deviation
5.79
5.70
5.74
5.97
5.75

The participants exhibited the lowest willingness to pay for the United States farm
raised shrimp with a mean Bid of $5.61. This result was not surprising; the United States
farm raised shrimp was rated as the worst tasting and was rated low in other attributes as
well. The participants’ willingness to pay for the farm raised Thailand product was the
second lowest with a mean of $5.72. The mean willingness to pay for the local shrimp
was $7.04. The Local shrimp had a similar taste rating to that of the Thailand shrimp so
the higher willingness to pay for the local product does not appear to be driven by taste.
The other attributes do not appear to explain the higher Bid either. Participants were
willing to pay less for the two farm raised products; this indicates that the participants
might prefer fresh caught shrimp.
Table 5.16 displays information regarding the level of the significant differences
between the mean bids for the various types of shrimp. The mean Bids for the Gulf Coast
and USA Fresh catch products are significantly different than the mean Bids for the
Thailand and United States Farm Raised products.
When participant level fixed effects are included to control for unobservable
participant characteristics, the mean willingness to pay for the USA Farm raised product
is significantly different from the mean bids for all types but willingness to pay for the
Thailand shrimp (See Table 5.17). Also, the mean Bid for the Thailand shrimp was
significantly different from the mean bid for the other types of shrimp. The results are
very similar to the results presented in Table 5.16.
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Table 5.16: Bid Means Significant Differences
i/j

Gulf Coast

Gulf
Coast

Local

Thailand

USA Farm

US Fresh
Catch

0.149941
(0.8809)

1.845039
(0.0656)

1.982873
(0.0479)

-0.2603
(0.7947)

1.695098
(0.0906)

1.832932
(0.0674)

-0.41024
(0.6818)

0.137834
(0.8904)

-2.10534
(0.0357)

Local

-0.14994
(0.8809)

Thailand

-1.84504
(0.0656)

-1.6951
(0.0906)

USA
Farm

-1.98287
(0.0479)

-1.83293
(0.0674)

-0.13783
(0.8904)

US Fresh
Catch

0.260301
(0.7947)

0.410241
(0.6818)

2.10534
(0.0357)

-2.24317
(0.0253)
2.243173
(0.0253)

Note: H0: LSMean(i)=LSMean(j), t-statistics are reported with corresponding p-values in
parenthesis

i/j

Table 5.17: Fixed Effects Bid Means Significant Differences
Gulf Coast
Local
Thailand
USA Farm
US Fresh
Catch

Gulf
Coast

0.296727
0.7668

Local

-0.29673
0.7668

Thailand

-3.65127
0.0003

-3.35454
0.0009

USA
Farm

-3.92403
0.0001

-3.62731
0.0003

3.651266
0.0003

3.924034
0.0001

-0.51513
0.6067

3.354539
0.0009

3.627307
0.0003

-0.81185
0.4173

0.272768
0.7852

-4.16639
<.0001

-0.27277
0.7852

-4.43916
<.0001

US Fresh 0.515126
0.811853
4.166392
4.43916
Catch
0.6067
0.4173
<.0001
<.0001
Note: H0: LSMean(i)=LSMean(j), t-statistics are reported with corresponding p-values in
parenthesis
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Ordinary Least Squares Regression
In an effort to analyze the factors affecting participants’ willingness to pay for
shrimp products, ordinary least squares regression analysis was conducted. Participants
were asked to bid their highest willingness to pay for each type of shrimp; hence the
dependent variable, ―Bid‖, served as a proxy for willingness to pay. The participants
rating of size (Size), taste (Taste), smell (Smell), and appearance (Appearance) were
included in the model as independent variables. An indicator variable, TryShrimp, was
included to determine if not tasting the shrimp affected participants’ bids; TryShrimp=1 if
the participant tried the shrimp and TryShrimp=0 if the participant did not. The
interaction of the TryShrimp indicator and taste was included in the model to avoid losing
the observations of those participants that did not taste the shrimp. Indicator variables
taking the value of one if true and zero otherwise were included in the model for each
type of shrimp (Type USA Farm, Type Thailand, Type Gulf Coast, Type Local) except
the USA Fresh Catch shrimp, which was treated as the baseline for comparison since it
was a U.S. fresh catch non-local product not from the Gulf Coast. The model was
specific without an intercept.
Given that each of the participants bid on five types of shrimp, there were 550
observations. The effects of Appearance, Taste, Tryshrimp, Smell, and Type Thailand
were significant at the five percent level. The coefficient on the Type Gulf Coast
indicator variable was negative and significant at the ten percent level, providing
evidence of stigma. The coefficient estimate for taste was 0.44; this means that for every
one point increase in the taste rating, the participant was willing to pay $0.44 more.
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Participants were willing to pay $1.75 less for Type Thailand shrimp than the baseline.
Also, participants were willing to pay $1.28 less for the Type Gulf Coast shrimp than a
similarly rated U.S. fresh catch shrimp holding all other attributes constant. This model
had an r-square of 0.14. The regression results are summarized in Table 5.18. The
standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
To more clearly identify stigma effects, local effects and preferences for product’s
origins and production process, further regression analysis was conducted. In this
analysis, the indicator variables for the types of shrimp were replaced with additional
indicator variables for if the shrimp was from the United States of American (USA), if
the shrimp was fresh caught (Fresh), if the shrimp was harvested locally (Local) and if
the shrimp was caught in the Gulf of Mexico (Gulf).
This model had an r-square of 0.14. The effects of Smell, Taste, TryShrimp and
Appearance were significant at the five percent level, while the effect of Gulf Coast was
significant at the ten percent level. The coefficient estimates are similar to the first model.
The results are summarized in Table 5.18.
In these regressions, there is not any evidence of a local effect. The coefficient
estimates for Type Local and local were not significant. However, there was some
indication that participants preferred domestic products because the Type Thailand
shrimp had a negative significant coefficient estimate.
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Table 5.18: Ordinary Least Squares Regression Model
Variable
Size

Type
0.08668
(0.12958)

Attribute
0.08668
(0.12958)

Taste*TryShrimp

0.44078 ***
(0.11811)

0.44078 ***
(0.11811)

TryShrimp=0

3.41486 ***
(1.03548)

1.66087
(0.84935)

TryShrimp=1

-0.72565
(1.16839)

-2.47964 ***
(1.06058)

Appearance

0.31199 ***
(0.12733)

0.31199 ***
(0.12733)

Smell

0.37490 ***
(0.12484)

0.37490 ***
(0.12484)

Type Gulf_Coast

-1.28265 *
(0.77143)

-

Type Local

-0.39099
(0.77162)

-

Type Thailand

-1.75399 ***
(0.84842)

-

Type USA_Farm

-0.91202
(0.80184)

-

Gulf

-

-1.28265 *
(0.77143)

USA

-

0.84196
(0.77421)

Local

-

-0.39099
(0.77162)

Fresh

-

0.91202
(0.80184)

0.14770

0.14770

R-Square

Note: Coefficient estimates are presented with p-value in parenthesis,*** significant at
five percent level, * significance at the ten percent level
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Ordinary Least Square with Fixed Effects
Additional regression analysis was conducted using a fixed effects model with
participant-level fixed effects to control for unobserved participant characteristics. These
models were specified without an intercept. The previous models were re-estimated with
participant level fixed effects.
In the fixed effects model with indicator variables for the types of shrimp the
effects of Taste, TryShrimp, Appearance, Type Gulf Coast, Type Thailand, and Type
USA Farm Raised were significant. The coefficient on the indicator variable for Type
Gulf Coast shrimp was negative and significant at a five percent level, providing
evidence of stigma. Both coefficients for the indicator variables for Type Thailand and
Type USA Farm Raised were significant and negative, displaying evidence of stigma
associated with farm raised products. The results indicate that if a participant rated taste 1
point higher on the likert scale, then they would be willing to pay $0.58 more for that
shrimp. Participants were willing to pay $1.31 less for the Gulf coast shrimp than the
U.S. Fresh Catch shrimp, and $1.75 for Thailand shrimp and $0.85 less for USA Farm
than the U.S. Fresh Catch shrimp. The r-square of the model was 0.86. These results are
presented in Table 5.19.
When the fixed effects regression analysis was repeated, with the indicator
variables for the shrimp types replaced with indicator variables for USA, Fresh, Local,
and Gulf, the model yielded an identical r-square as the model with the type indicator
variables. The effects of Taste, TryShrimp=0, Appearance, Gulf, USA, and Fresh were
significant.
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Table 5.19: Fixed Effects Ordinary Least Squares Model
Variable
Size

Type
0.01136
(0.06985)

Attribute
0.01136
(0.06985)

Taste*TryShrimp

0.58205 ***
(0.06406)

0.58205 ***
(0.06406)

TryShrimp=0

5.21823 ***
(1.37082)

3.47006 ***
(1.32887)

TryShrimp=1

3.30899 ***
(1.29152)

1.56082
(1.24715)

Appearance

0.29798
(0.0683)

0.29798
(0.0683)

Smell

0.01181
(0.07635)

Type Gulf_Coast

-1.30797 ***
(0.35805)

-

Type Local

-0.31394
(0.35589)

Type Thailand

-1.74817 ***
(0.40229)

-

Type USA_Farm

-0.84676 ***
(0.37365)

-

Gulf

-

***

***

0.01181
(0.07635)

-

-1.30797 ***
(0.35805)

USA

-

0.84676 ***
(0.37365)

Local

-

-0.31394
(0.35589)

0.859116

0.859116

Fresh

R-Square

0.90141
(0.3609)

***

Note: Coefficient estimates are presented with p-value in parenthesis,*** significant at
five percent level, * significance at the ten percent level
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The effect of the Gulf Coast shrimp indicator variable was significant at the five
percent level and was negative, which displays evidence of stigma. The coefficient on
the indicator variable for USA products was positive and significant, providing evidence
of stigma against imported products. Also, the coefficient estimate for Fresh was
positive and significant, indicating evidence of stigma against farm raised shrimp.
Participants were willing to pay on average $0.90 more for the fresh caught shrimp and
willing to pay $1.31 less for the Gulf Coast shrimp than the U.S. Fresh Catch shrimp.
Also, participants were willing to pay a premium of $0.85 for the USA shrimp.
Ordinary Least Squares Regression with Indicator Variables for Censoring Model
The fixed effects models do not address the potential bias of the parameter
estimates due to the dependent variable being censored. The lowest value that a
participant could bid was $0.00 while the highest possible bid was $20.00. Thus, the
dependent variable was censored. In fact, 105 bids were placed on the boundaries; 86 at
$0.00 and 19 at $20.00. By using a model that corrects for censoring, the bias of the
parameter estimates is reduced.
A model was developed that related bid to type of shrimp and a group of
covariates. The bid was bounded (or censored) at $0 and $20, so the form of the model
had to incorporate these bounds. The method chosen for this analysis was to develop
three indicator variables that split the data into sections. The first indicator variable
created was equal to one if the bid was equal to $0 and called Bid0. The second indicator
variable was equal to one if the bid was greater than $0 and less than $20 and called
BidBetween. The third indicator variable was one if the bid was $20 and called Bid20.
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The final form of the model was:
Eq. 5.1

( )

( (

))

(

)

This form of the model differs from traditional survival and tobit type models in
that the censoring bounds and the probability of being in the censored groups are known
and hence do no need to be estimated and the parameters can be estimated with
traditional least squares instead of using maximum likelihood estimation techniques.
The first model constructed to control for censoring regressed Size, Taste,
Appearance, Smell, TryShrimp, and the indicator variables for the types of shrimp on the
dependent variable Bid. The r-square of the mode was 0.40 and the effects of Taste,
TryShrimp, Appearance, and Type Thailand were significant at five percent level. The
coefficient on the indicator variable for Type Thailand was significant and negative at a
five percent level, indicating stigma may be attached to imports. The coefficient estimate
of the indicator variable for Gulf Coast was negative and significant at the ten percent
level, thus providing evidence of stigma. Participants, who bid within $0.00 to $20.00,
were willing to pay on average $1.11 less for the Gulf Coast shrimp than the U.S. fresh
caught shrimp. When rating Taste 1 point higher on the ratings scale, participants were
willing to pay $0.40 more for the product. Finally, consumers bidding between $0.00 and
$20.00 devaluated the Thailand shrimp by $2.05 compared to the baseline shrimp, which
was the U.S. fresh caught shrimp (Table 5.20).
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Table 5.20: Censored Regression Model
Variable
Size*BidBetween

Type
-.06113
(0.12238)

Taste*TryShrimp*BidBetween

.40005
(0.11025)

***

.40005
(0.11025)

***

Tyrshrimp=0*BidBetween

7.00763
(1.08245)

***

4.95584
(1.02733)

***

TryShrimp=1*BidBetween

2.13499
(1.06718)

***

.08321
(0.93873)

Appearance*BidBetween

.37892
(0.1138)

***

.37892
(0.1138)

Smell*BidBetween

.14872
(0.1198)

Type Gulf_Coast*BidBetween

-1.1148
(0.66659)

Type Local*BidBetween

-.77275
(0.66998)

Type Thailand*BidBetween

-2.05179
(0.75862)

Type USA_Farm*BidBetween

-1.08173
(0.70403)

-

Gulf*BidBetween

-

-1.1148
(0.66659)

USA*BidBetween

-

.97006
(0.69826)

Local*BidBetween

-

-.77275
(0.66998)

Fresh*BidBetween

-

1.08173
(0.70403)

.39538

.39538

R-Square

Attribute
-.06113
(0.12238)

***

.14872
(0.1198)
*

-

***

-

*

Note: Coefficient estimates are presented with p-value in parenthesis,*** significant at
five percent level, * significance at the ten percent level
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The analysis was repeated. In this second model, the indicator variables for the
type of shrimp were excluded and replaced with the indicator variables for Gulf, USA,
Fresh, and Local. The r-square was the exactly same as in the previous model, however,
only the effects of Taste, Tryshrimp=0, and Appearance were significant at a five percent
significance level. The coefficient estimate of the indicator variable for Gulf was
negative and significant at the ten percent level, displaying evidence of stigma. These
results are highlighted in Table 5.20.
Other factors that might influence willingness to pay for shrimp were added to the
censored models and the regression analysis was repeated. Ate (last ate), Primary
Purchaser (if the participants was the primary purchaser for the household), Non South
Carolina Resident (does not live in South Carolina), Non-United States Citizen (does not
live in the United States), income (grouped into 8 income brackets instead of 16), and a
variable that captured the participant’s understanding of the bidding process (BDM) were
added to the model. Participants entered when they last ate in hours ago for the variable
Ate, and participants could chose if they were the primary purchase, if they split
purchasing decision or if they were not the primary purchase of their household. Also,
participants were asked their primary state of residence. Those who answered ―South
Carolina‖ were grouped into a category called Resident of South Carolina and all the
others were non-residents. Also, the same was done for resident of the United States.
Income was divided into 16 $10,000 bands, and then the bands were combined to form 8
$20,000 bands. BDM was the average deviation of the participant’s bid from the
participant’s cash value in the last two practice rounds. The model with the additional
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variables which used the indicator variables for the types of shrimp yielded an r-square of
0.50. The effects of Taste, TryShrimp=0, Appearance, BDM, Ate, Non-United States
Citizen, Not Primary Purchaser, Non-SC Resident, Type Gulf Coast, Type Thailand, and
Type USA Farm Raised were significant at the five percent level. The effect of Smell
was significant at the ten percent level. Again, Gulf Coast’s coefficient estimate was
negative, providing evidence of stigma. Both Thailand and USA Farm Raised had
coefficient estimates that were negative and significant, suggesting farm raised products
are stigmatized. In this regression, the participants that bid between $0.00 and $20.00
would pay $0.29 on average for shrimp that had a one point improvement on the ratings
scale. Also, participants would pay $1.22 less for shrimp from the Gulf Coast and $2.03
for shrimp that was from Thailand compared to the baseline shrimp. The participants
also devaluated USA farm raised shrimp by $1.15 relative to the baseline shrimp. These
results are summarized in Table 5.21.
The analysis was repeated using the indicator variables Fresh, Local, USA, and
Gulf and the type variables were excluded. The coefficients of Taste, TryShrimp=1,
Appearance, BDM, Non-United States Citizen, Not Primary Purchase, Non-SC Resident,
Gulf were significant at five percent. The coefficient on the indicator variable Gulf was
significant and negative displaying evidence of stigma. The coefficient estimates that
were significant at the ten percent were Smell, Ate and Fresh. The indicator variable for
Fresh had a positive coefficient estimate that was significant at the ten percent level,
providing evidence of stigma associated with farm raised products.
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Table 5.21: Complex Censored Regression
Variable
Size*BidBetween

Type
0.06291
(0.10708)

Attribute
0.06291
(0.10708)

Taste*TryShrimp*BidBetween

0.29393 ***
(0.09721)

0.29393 ***
(0.09721)

Taste*TryShrimp=0*BidBetween

4.20506 ***
(1.38339)

Taste*TryShrimp=1*BidBetween

-0.16999
(1.34704)

-2.19539 *
(1.28313)

Appearance*BidBetween

0.46541 ***
(0.10033)

0.46541 ***
(0.10033)

Smell*BidBetween

0.17668 *
(0.10617)

0.17668 *
(0.10617)

BDM*BidBetween

0.93063 ***
(0.20322)

0.93063 ***
(0.20322)

Ate*BidBetween

0.00924
(0.0188)

0.00924
(0.0188)

Age*BidBetween

-0.02243
(0.0152)

-0.02243
(0.0152)

Non-CItizenUSA*BidBetween

3.61137 ***
(0.58941)

3.61137 ***
(0.58941)

NotPrimaryPurchaser*BidBetween

0.58900
(0.50694)

0.58900
(0.50694)

SplitPurchaser*BidBetween

-2.53976
(1.93069)

-2.53976
(1.93069)

Non-ResidentofSC*BidBetween

2.12378
(0.4289)

***

2.17966
(1.358)

2.12378
(0.4289)

***

Note: Coefficient estimates are presented with p-value in parenthesis,*** significant at
five percent level, * significance at the ten percent level
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Table 5.21: Complex Censored Regression (Continued)
Variable
Income NoResponse*BidBetween

Type
3.00992 ***
(1.47889)

Attribute
3.00992 ***
(1.47889)

Income (0-20000)*BidBetween

-2.40820 ***
(0.93798)

-2.40820 ***
(0.93798)

Income (20000-40000)*BidBetween

-0.02968
(0.86098)

-0.02968
(0.86098)

Income (40000-60000)*BidBetween

1.36157
(0.90415)

1.36157
(0.90415)

Income (60000-80000)*BidBetween

-0.27137
(0.92141)

-0.27137
(0.92141)

Income (80000-100000)*BidBetween

0.29786
(0.94506)

0.29786
(0.94506)

Income (100000-120000)*BidBetween

7.48719 ***
(1.86698)

7.48719 ***
(1.86698)

Income (120000-140000)*BidBetween

0.35382
(1.25744)

0.35382
(1.25744)

Type Gulf_Coast*BidBetween

-1.21788 ***
(0.57768)

-

Type Local*BidBetween

-0.89150
(0.57903)

-

Type Thailand*BidBetween

-2.02540 ***
(0.65805)

-

Type USA_FARM*BidBetween

-1.15462 *
(0.60847)

-

Gulf*BidBetween

-

-1.21788 ***
(0.57768)

USA*BidBetween

-

0.87078
(0.60498)

Local*BidBetween

-

-0.89150
(0.57903)

Fresh*BidBetween

-

1.15462 *
(0.60847)

R-Square

0.55416

0.55416

Note: Coefficient estimates are presented with p-value in parenthesis,*** significant at
five percent level, * significance at the ten percent level
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Gulf Coast shrimp’s coefficient estimate was negative and significant as the previous
model compared to the U.S. Fresh Caught shrimp. Participants were willing to pay a
premium of $1.15 for the fresh caught shrimp compared to the farm raised shrimp. These
results are summarized in Table 5.21.
Ordinary Least Squares Fixed Effects Regression with Indicator Variables for
Censoring Model
Participant-level fixed effects were added to the censoring models to control for
unobserved participant characteristics. When the indicator variables for the types of
shrimp were included in the model, the model had an r-square of 0.88 and the coefficients
on Taste, TryShrimp*BidBetween, Appearance, Type Gulf Coast, Type Thailand, and
Type USA Farm were all significant at the five percent significance level. Participants
were willing to pay $1.06 less for the Gulf Coast shrimp, $1.91 less for the Thailand
shrimp, and $0.73 less for the USA Farm shrimp than the baseline shrimp. When the
indicator variables for the types of shrimp were replaced with indicator variables for USA,
Gulf, Fresh and the only coefficients that were significant at a five percent level were
Taste, TryShrimp, Appearance, Gulf, USA, and Fresh. The participants who bid within
the bounds valued shrimp coming from the United States $1.19 more than imported
products, and those same participants valued fresh caught shrimp $0.73 higher than farm
raised products. This analysis is displayed in Table 5.22.
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Table 5. 22: Fixed Effects Censored Regression Model
Variable
Size*BidBetween

Type
-0.05863
(0.07628)

Attribute
-0.05863
(0.07628)

Taste*TryShrimp*BidBetween

0.56010
(0.07003)

***

0.56010
(0.07003)

***

TryShrimp=0*BidBetween

6.21607
(1.37308)

***

4.83808
(1.4735)

***

TryShrimp=1*BidBetween

3.36873
(1.21892)

***

1.99074
(1.27304)

Appearance*BidBetween

0.31319
(0.07023)

***

0.31319
(0.07023)

Smell*BidBetween

0.09129
(0.08248)

Type Gulf_Coast*BidBetween

-1.06423
(0.36308)

Type Local*BidBetween

-0.31376
(0.36223)

Type Thailand*BidBetween

-1.91525
(0.41607)

***

-

Type USA_FARM*BidBetween

-0.72570
(0.38263)

***

-

***

0.09129
(0.08248)
***

-

Gulf*BidBetween

-

-1.06423
(0.36308)

***

USA*BidBetween

-

1.18955
(0.38207)

***

Local*BidBetween

-

-0.31376
(0.36223)

Fresh*BidBetween

-

0.72570
(0.38263)

0.87738

0.87738

R-Square

***

Note: Coefficient estimates are presented with p-value in parenthesis,*** significant at
five percent level, * significance at the ten percent level
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Implications of Main Findings
Evidence of Stigma
The results provide evidence that Gulf Coast shrimp are stigmatized. The Gulf
Coast shrimp had the highest rated attribute set and therefore it was expected that they
would also have the highest willingness to pay. Yet, the prices participates were willing
to pay do not accurately reflect the attribute ratings for the Gulf Coast. The mean bid for
the USA Fresh Catch shrimp was $0.20 higher than the mean bid for the Gulf Coast
product. The USA Fresh Catch shrimp was rated the second highest in every category
except appearance in which it was rated the lowest. This shows evidence of stigma being
attached to products from the Gulf of Mexico. Clearly participants are internalizing
some belief that devalues the shrimp.
Furthermore, in each of regression models there is a constant theme -- the effect
of the Gulf Coast variable is significant and negative at either a five percent or ten
percent significance level. This indicates that the participants are placing a lower value
on shrimp products derived from the Gulf Coast. Because the effect is significant in all
the models and robust to specification, it is clear that consumers are stigmatizing Gulf
Coast products because of the oil spill.
Preferences for Domestic Products
The results also indicate that participants prefer USA products. The Thailand
shrimp ratings do not appear to correspond with the bids. The mean willingness to pay
for the Thailand shrimp is similar to the mean willingness to pay for United States farm
raised product however the United States farm raised product was rated the lowest in
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every attribute. Moreover, the mean willingness pay for the Thailand shrimp is a full
dollar less than the mean willingness to pay for the similarly rated Local shrimp; although
the difference in willingness to pay for these two products may be driven by preferences
for fresh caught products.
The coefficient on Thailand was negative and significant in every regression
model, which demonstrates that the participants have preferences for domestic products
and that consumers are willing to pay more for a USA product. Hence, this provides
evidence that consumers care where their food comes from and benefit from country of
origin labeling. Perhaps they feel that shrimp derived from Thailand does not deserve a
premium since the shrimp coming from the United States is of better quality.
Furthermore, USA is significant in the majority of the models in which it is
included. In those models, USA has a positive coefficient estimate; this means that
consumers are willing to pay a higher price for a product from the United States. This
indicates that COOL may benefit producers because consumers will pay a higher
premium for products that come from the United States.
Preferences for Fresh Caught Products
In the fixed effects models, the coefficient on Fresh is positive and significant.
This demonstrates that consumers are willing to pay a higher price for fresh caught
shrimp. The farm raised production process uses lots of chemicals, thus farm raised
products may be stigmatized.
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Evidence of Local Effects
The summary statistics suggested that a local effect may exist. A local effect was
suspected since the ratings of the local shrimp where similar to those of the Thailand
shrimp, but the mean willingness to pay for the local shrimp was over $1.00 more than
Thailand’s mean willingness to pay. The local effect seemed reasonable because of
South Carolina’s ―SC Grown‖ initiative. However once the regression analysis was
conducted, the effect of the local variable was not significant in any of the models. The
effect may be present but not enough to have a significant effect.
In the final chapter, the conclusion is presented. Further research on the data set
is discussed. Also, the implications of the findings to the shrimping industry are
discussed and the potential impacts. Finally, suggested improvements of the experiment
and future research ideas are presented to help future readers increase the overall
effectiveness of the experimental methods used.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
Country of origin labeling was introduced in the 2002 Farm Bill. Covered commodities
were required to be labeled with their country of origin information. These covered
commodities included muscle cuts of beef, lamb and pork, ground beef, ground lamb, and
ground pork, farm-raised fish and shellfish, wild fish and shellfish, perishable agriculture
commodities (fresh and frozen fruits and vegetables), and peanuts.
Originally, country of origin labeling (COOL) was scheduled to be implemented
in 2004 but implementation was delayed (Agricultural Marketing Service 2008). The first
products to adhere to COOL were fish and shellfish with implementation occurring on
April 4, 2005 (Agricultural Marketing Service, 2008). The other commodities had to
wait more than three years for the mandatory country of origin labeling to be fully
implemented. However, by this time, the list of covered commodities had grown to
include chicken, goat, ground chicken, ground goat, macadamia nuts, pecans, and
ginseng (Agricultural Marketing Service, 2008).
COOL was implemented following decades of lobbing for country of origin
labeling on food products by agricultural and consumer advocacy groups (Krissoff et al.,
2004). Supporters argued that COOL would benefit U.S. producers and consumers. This
argument was based on the assumption that consumers prefer domestic products to
import products and hence the demand for U.S. products would shift outward following
the implementation of COOL.
However, country of origin labeling had the potential to affect both supply and
demand. Producers were expected to incur compliance costs (maintaining information
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and labeling). These costs were expected to increase producers’, retailers’, and packers’
marginal costs. Additionally, as previously stated, COOL affects demand if consumers
with preferences for domestic or imported goods are willing to pay a premium for
products corresponding to their preferences. Therefore, country of origin labeling can
lead to shifts in supply and demand.
Focusing on shrimp, the difficulties in determining what causes demand to shift
following the implementation of COOL quickly becomes apparent. Shrimp is produced
by two main production processes and consumers have preferences for each process. The
two processes are fresh caught and farm raised. Fresh caught is the most commonly used
production process in the United States. Farm raised products do exist in the United
States but are very rare; most farm raised shrimp are imported. Hence, it is necessary to
separate consumer preferences for the production process from preferences for the
products origin.
Fresh caught shrimp are harvested directly from the ocean. The process supports
many Americans’ incomes and has been around for centuries, but it is controversial. This
method of shrimp production has been under fire because of by-catch rates (non-intended
species captured in the nets) and destruction of the ocean floor due to the trawl nets.
The alternative production process used to rear shrimp is aquaculture. Farm
raised shrimp are produced in managed in-land ponds, so farmers can precisely control
the environment. By rearing shrimp in pounds, producers can control the size and
quantity of the shrimp to meet demand. Shrimp farming is viewed as a way of decreasing
poverty and creating jobs, and it has been promoted by the World Bank and Asian
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Development Bank. As a result, many countries have invested in export-driven shrimp
farming industry to attract foreign capital (Environmental Justice Foundation, 2003).
However, shrimp farming leads to chemical and biological pollutants and nutrient wastes.
Large quantities of antibiotics, algaecides, disinfectants, detergents, and soil treatment
chemicals are used in aquaculture ponds throughout the world (Graslund and Bengtsson,
2001). Chemicals are used to control different pathogens, induce plankton growth, and
inoculate farmed larvae. Besides chemical pollutants in farm raised shrimp, other
chemicals pollutants resulting from manmade occurrences have affected the shrimp
industry and demand for shrimp.
On Tuesday, April 20, 2010 a British Petroleum (BP) Transocean oil rig, known
as the DeepWater Horizon, experienced an explosion in the Gulf of Mexico. Two days
later another explosion occurred and a five mile long oil slick resulted from the damage
(Guardian, 2010). Then, on April 25, 2010, the United States Coast Guard discovered that
an oil well at the site of the explosion was leaking 1,000 barrels of crude oil per day
(CNBC, 2010). On April 28, the United State Coast Guard revised this estimated to
5,000 barrels of oil per day (CNBC, 2010; Guardian, 2010). Finally, on July 12, after
several attempts, BP stopped the oil leak (CNBC, 2010). The leak led to extensive
fishing bans in the Gulf of Mexico.
Because of the oil spill, there is potential for consumer to stigmatize shrimp
originating from the Gulf of Mexico. The term stigma has deep roots in psychology and
occurs when an object comes into direct contact with an object that is contaminated or
stigmatized (Rozin, Millman, and Nemeroff, 1986). In this case, shrimp from the Gulf of
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Mexico came into contact with oil and chemical dispersants used in the clean-up. Even
though shrimp from the Gulf of Mexico have been deemed safe for consumption,
consumers may still believe that it is unsafe and hence avoid consuming it.
All these aforementioned factors have the potential to affect consumers’
willingness to pay for shrimp. However, the most important attributes influencing
willingness to pay may be the size, appearance, smell, and taste of the shrimp. These
attributes often influence consumers’ purchasing decisions. However, acknowledging
that stigma exists, consumers might ignore these factors and base their purchasing
decisions on only stigma.
In order to analyze how the different production processes, attributes, and stigma
impact willingness to pay an experiment was designed. The experiment used the BeckerDeGroot-Marschack (BDM) mechanism to elicit consumers’ willingness to pay for five
types of shrimp: 1) Gulf Coast Fresh Caught, 2) North Carolina/South Carolina Coast
Fresh Caught, 3) United States Farm Raised shrimp, 4) Thailand Farm Raised, and 5)
United States Fresh Caught (Non North Carolina/South Carolina Coast, Non Gulf Coast).
The experimental findings indicate that Gulf Coast products are stigmatized, preferences
for fresh caught products, and preferences for domestic products.
The results indicate that the Gulf Coast shrimp were stigmatized. The summary
statistics indicated the stigma effect; the Gulf Coast shrimp the highest rated attribute set,
but had the second highest willingness to pay. Also, the regression models provided
more evidence of stigma. The coefficient estimate on Gulf Coast’s was significant and
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negative in every regression model at either a ten percent or a five percent significance
level.
The evidence of stigma on products from the Gulf Coast suggests that producers
whose operations are located in the region may incur additional suffering. Because the
2010 BP oil spill was a newsworthy event, everyone in the United States and around the
world learned about this event. As a result, consumers will chose not to consume
products (not just shrimp) from the Gulf of Mexico because of they fear the products are
contaminated. This effect has the potential to last a long period of time. Hence,
producers in the Gulf of Mexico will receive lower prices and less profit for goods that
may be of equal or greater quality than their competitor’s goods which are receiving
higher prices. Some producers might have to cease operations and the industry might
shrink causing many Americans to have to find alternative income sources.
Also, the participants had preferences for domestic goods. The participants’ bids
did not correspond to their ratings of the Thailand farm raised shrimp. The ratings for the
Thailand shrimp were similar to the North Carolina/South Carolina Coast shrimp, but the
willingness to pay for the Thailand shrimp was similar to the willingness to pay for the
United States farm raised shrimp. In several of the models, the indicator variable USA
had a significant coefficient estimate. The estimate was positive, implying that
participants were willing to pay a premium for domestic products. This demonstrates that
the participants preferred domestic shrimp over imported shrimp.
Participants’ preferences for domestic products over imported products suggest
that by labeling products, U.S. producers will be able to command a premium on their
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products. Also, many consumers may have the belief that since the shrimp is imported
the shrimp is of lower quality, even if the shrimp is of higher quality than the domestic
product. This could lead to fewer choices in supermarkets if imported products are no
longer offered and consumers are content with paying a higher price for a lower quality
good from the United States.
In several models, specifically the fixed effects models, the coefficient estimate
for Fresh was positive and significant. This coupled with the previous findings pertaining
to Thailand farm raised shrimp, seems to indicate that consumers will pay a premium for
shrimp produced using the fresh caught process. The farm raised shrimp may be
stigmatized and consumers may view farm raised shrimp as risky to consume because of
the chemicals used in the production process. In order for consumers to get a positive
view of shrimp farming, fewer chemicals need to be used. Probiotics is currently being
explored to decrease the number of chemicals used in farm raised shrimp. If technology
can improve to a point where farm raised shrimp uses less chemicals and becomes
sustainable then farm raised shrimp will become a viable alternative.
A local effect was expected because the ratings of the North Carolina/South
Carolina fresh caught shrimp were similar to that of Thailand farm raised shrimp;
however participants were willing to pay over a dollar more for the North Carolina/South
Carolina product. Because of South Carolina’s ―SC Grown‖ initiative this effect seemed
plausible. Contrary to initial evidence, the regression equations demonstrated no
evidence of a local effect.

115

These findings imply that the ―SC Grown‖ initiative may not be working. Maybe
the advertising of the ―SC Grown‖ initiative is lacking and consumers do not know about
the program. South Carolina consumers do not appear to believe that South Carolina’s
goods deserve a premium.
Limiting Factors and Further Research
If this experiment was to be conducted again there are several modifications that
could be made to improve the experiment and the results. Conducting the experiment in
only one location, only one time, and using only 5 shrimp varieties did not exploit the full
potential of the experiment. Also, improvements can be made to the experiment to
interpret the results easier.
The results may have been different if the study was conducted in a different
location. Conducting this study in only one location may influence the results. An
interesting alternative would be to conduct the experiment in the Gulf Coast states or in
states that are not shrimp producing states. This way a sample can be gathered from
different locations and have more participants preferences than just the Clemson area.
Finally, if this experiment is replicated in different shrimp producing states, a different
local effect can be tested and maybe different results would arise.
Also, conducting the experiment over a period of time would be interesting. If the
experiment was replicated at a later date it could be used to analyze whether the stigma
effect declines as time passes. This experiment was conducted when the BP oil spill was
fresh in participants’ minds. Analyzing how these views change as the spill becomes less
and less memorable would be very interesting.
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Adding different varieties of imported shrimp would be a nice addition to the
experiment performed in this thesis. Only having one imported shrimp, a farm raised
Thailand variety, did not give a very representative sample of the different types of
imported shrimp. If a fresh catch imported variety was included the results might give
more insight into preferences for imported shrimp. Also, having participants bid on a
farm raised variety from a third country might improve the results because participants
may have a bias against Thailand products. Furthermore, the use of the North
Carolina/South Carolina shrimp may not have been ideal to test for a local effect because
participants in South Carolina may have a bias against North Carolina.
Additionally, changing the experimental procedure may change the results. The
participants were given the shrimp handout prior to rating the attributes of the shrimp. If
the participants rated the shrimp and then found out what shrimp type they rated, the
stigma effects may be even more noticeable.
Also, if questions were added to the survey more concise relationships could be
explored. If questions were added regarding the BP oil spill and the probability that the
shrimp was contaminated with oil or clean-up chemicals, then the probabilities
participants assigned to contamination would be revealed. These could be analyzed with
their corresponding bids and ratings. Also, if a question was added asking if it was more
dangerous to consume shrimp exposed to clean-up chemicals after the oil spill or shrimp
exposed to oil, then the stigma effects could be separated into categories.
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Appendices
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Appendix 1: Email to Potential Participants
You are invited to participate in a household decision making study. The study will allow you to
earn up to $20 by making everyday decisions similar the ones that you encounter when
shopping at a store. The study will last approximately an hour and your participation would be
greatly appreciated. Study sessions will be held Monday-Friday, October XX-XX at XXpm and
XXpm

If interested please contact:
Addison Ellis
addisoe@clemson.edu
In your email please indicate all sessions for which you are able to attend.
This study has been approved by Clemson’s IRB (#IRB2010-205)
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Appendix 2: Instructions for the Experiment
Instructions (Part A)
Hello, welcome to an experiment in the household purchasing decisions. In the course of
the experiment, you will have several opportunities to earn money. Any money earned
during this experiment is yours to keep, thus please read these instructions carefully.
Additionally, you are guaranteed a $5.00 show-up fee for participating, regardless of
what you may earn during the experiment. Please do not communicate with other
participants during the experiment. As stated in the Consent Form, your participation in
this experiment is voluntary.
In today’s experiment, you will be asked to indicate the highest amount of money you
would spend for different purchasing decisions. We will refer to this amount as your bid.
Sometimes a purchase decision will refer to a cash value and sometimes it will refer to a
food item.
For the first several purchase decisions, the experiment proceeds as follows:
First, you will receive an initial balance of $5. You will then be informed of your cash
value that you would receive if you purchase the decision. Your cash values will vary
during the course of the experiment. The possible amounts are $1, $2.50, and $4.
You will then be asked to indicate the highest amount that you would pay for this
purchase decision. For each decision, you can bid any amount between $0 and your
initial balance of $5. Once you have decided your bid, you will type it into the computer
spreadsheet, hit ENTER on the keyboard, and then click the ―Submit‖ button. After
everyone has submitted their bids, the price for the purchase decision will be determined.
The price will be determined by having a volunteer subject drop a pen onto a random
number table. Since these numbers have been generated by a random number table each
price between $0.00 and $5.00 is equally likely. Whether the decision is purchased
depends on your bid and the randomly determined price. There are two possible
outcomes:
The decision is PURCHASED: The decision is purchased if your bid is equal to or
greater than the price. In this case, you will receive the cash value in addition to your
initial balance of $5. However, you will also have to pay the randomly determined price.
Therefore, your earnings would be your initial balance, plus your cash value, minus the
price.
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The decision is NOT PURCHASED: The decision is not purchased if your bid is less
than the price. In this case, you will not receive the cash value, but you will not have to
pay the price. Therefore, your earnings would simply be your initial balance of $5.

In this setting, it is in your best interest (i.e. you will make the most possible earnings) if
you submit bids equal to your cash value for the decision. Note that while your bid helps
determine whether the decision is purchased, your earnings are calculated based on your
initial balance, the cash value and the determined price (not your bid). For example, if a
decision was not purchased and the cash value was $2.50 and the determined price was
$4.50, your earnings would still be $5. However, if the decision was purchased with the
same cash value and price, your earnings would be $3 (=$5 + $2.50 - $4.50).
Example 1.
Outcome

Initial Balance

Cash Value

Price

Earnings

Purchased

$5.00

$2.50

-$4.50

$3.00

Not Purchased

$5.00

$2.50

-$4.50

$5.00

Consider another example where the cash value was $5 and the determined price was $1.
In this example if the decision was not purchased your earnings would again be $5, while
if the decision was purchased, your earnings would be $5.50 ($5 + $2.50 - $1).
Example 2.
Outcome

Initial Balance

Cash Value

Price

Earnings

Purchased

$5.00

$2.50

-$1.00

$6.50

Not Purchased

$5.00

$2.50

-$1.00

$5.00

Calculation of Earnings
After everyone has submitted their bids for the decision and the price has been
determined, the administrator will display all of the bids on the screen in the front of the
room. These bids will be displayed anonymously from lowest to highest and no subject
numbers will be associated with these bids. The administrator will then ask all the
participants the following questions:
1) Can you identify your bid?
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2) Which subjects purchased the decision?
3) How much will these subjects have to pay and how much will they earn in this
round?
4) How much will the subjects who did not purchase the decision earn in this
round?

Then you will be asked to click the RECEIVE button and the computer will display
whether you purchased the decision and calculate your earnings. The computer will add
your experimental earnings for all of the rounds, and convert this amount to US dollars
by applying an exchange rate of 3 experimental dollars to $1 USD. For example, if you
earn 30 experimental dollars, your monetary payoff from this part of the experiment
would be $10 USD.
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Instructions Part B
Pen as the Purchase Decision
You will be asked to indicate the highest amount of money you would pay for a pen
using the same procedures as discussed previously. In this case, your starting balance
will be $0.50 and you can submit any bid between $0 and $0.50. The random price will
again be determined using a random numbers table, however, now the price will range
from $0.00 to $0.50. In this part, there will not be an exchange rate as one experimental
dollar will equal $1 USD.
Note that in the case, you will need to determine the ―highest amount‖ that you would
pay to purchase this pencil. Again, it is in your best interest to submit a bid equal to this
highest amount, since, if you purchase the pencil, you will pay the randomly determined
price not your bid. The two possible outcomes are as follows:
The pen is PURCHASED: The pen is purchased if your bid is equal to or greater
than the price. In this case, you will receive the pen in addition to your initial balance of
$0.50. However, you will also have to pay the randomly determined price.
The pen is NOT PURCHASED: The pen is not purchased if your bid is less than the
price. In this case, you will not receive the pencil, but you will not have to pay the price.
Therefore, your cash earnings would simply be $0.50.

After everyone has submitted their bids and the price is determined, the administrators
will distribute the pens to the subjects which purchased them.
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Instructions (Part C)
The procedures are similar to the ones used in Part B of the experiment, with some
important differences.
You will receive an initial balance of $10. The purchase decision is for one pound of
shrimp. One pound of shrimp is equal to 16 ounces. The shrimp is fully cooked and is
currently being stored in the refrigerator in the building.
You will be making a total of five purchasing decisions regarding shrimp. However, only
one of the five types of shrimp will be selected for implementation and will result in cash
earnings. The type of shrimp that will be selected for implementation has been randomly
determined prior to the experiment and this information has been placed in a dated,
sealed envelope that will be opened at the end of the experiment. Each of the type of
shrimp is equally likely to be implemented. Therefore consider each decision as if it is
the one that will be actually implemented.
You will be served five types of shrimp. The shrimp will be placed a tasting sheet that
provides information related to the shrimp you will taste.
After sampling each shrimp type, please complete the questions related to the shrimp that
you tasted and then submit a bid for each type of shrimp. Again, your bid should
represent the highest amount that you would be willing to buy that pound of shrimp today.
You may bid any amount between $0 and $10 for each shrimp type. The price for the
decision will be determined in the same manner as in Part A using a new random number
table.
There are two possible outcomes:
The shrimp is PURCHASED: The pound of shrimp is purchased if your bid is equal
to or greater than the price. In this case, you will receive the pound of shrimp in
addition to your initial balance of $10. However, you will also have to pay the randomly
determined price.
The shrimp is NOT PURCHASED: The carton of shrimp is not purchased if your
bid is less than the price. In this case, you will not receive the pound of shrimp, but you
will not have to pay the price. Therefore, your cash earnings would simply be $10.
Please do not submit your bid until instructed by the administrator.
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In the event that the shrimp is purchased, you may either take it with you immediately, or
store it in the lab until the end of the day. Shrimp that is stored in the refrigerator can be
either picked-up or delivered to your office.
It is important that you clearly understand these instructions.
Please raise your hand if you have any questions.
Please do not talk with other participants in the experiment
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Appendix 3: Participant Informational Handout
In 2002, Congress amended the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946, in the Farm Security
and Rural Investment Act (FSRIA). In this Act, a provision was included that required
muscle cuts of beef, lamb, pork, ground beef, ground lamb, ground pork, farm-raised fish
and shellfish, wild fish and shellfish, perishable agriculture commodities, and peanuts to
have country-of-origin labeling. Country of Origin labeling requires that records be kept
of the processing of these goods; this can become very expensive to consumers. Country
of Origin labeling is very important in the shrimping business. Many countries have
standards that are different than the United States. For instance, many countries from
which fresh catch shrimp is harvested do not use turtle excluder devices which cause
endangered sea turtles to get caught in shrimp trawlers nets. This has caused the United
States to place bans on certain countries. As recently as April, the United States placed a
ban on Mexican shrimp because they were not using turtle excluder devices.
Fresh Catch or wild caught shrimp is shrimp that is harvested straight from the ocean.
The United States requires that their shrimping industry users turtle excluder devices.
These devices make sure that no sea turtles get caught in the shrimping nets. The United
States requires that other countries use turtle excluder devices for imports. Another issue
is if the oceans become polluted then the shrimp can get the pollutants too and they could
possibly be transferred to humans. Overfishing has become a problem and to solve these
problems other methods are being explored by other countries. The main alternative is
shrimp aquaculture or shrimp farming. Shrimp farming is intense, so bacterial outbreaks
are common. Shrimp ponds frequently require antibiotics. In addition to controlling
bacterial outbreaks, antibiotics are used to stimulate growth of the crustaceans. However,
the frequent use of antibiotics leads to resistance. Disinfectants, antibiotics, pesticides,
fertilizers, and different feed additives used in shrimp farming all have the potential to
cause toxic effects on cultured shrimp. Furthermore, these infections and resistance to
antibiotics might be transferred to humans, causing harm. Some chemicals used in the
farming of shrimp have negative effects on various ecosystems. The process of feeding
the shrimp is also controversial. Ten million tons of fish that could be consumed is being
turned into shrimp feed.
On April 20, 2010, a deepwater horizon oil rig had an explosion and fire that left eleven
people missing. On April 24, 2010 it was determined this explosion caused oil to leak
into the Gulf of Mexico. Once this leak was discovered 15,000 gallons of dispersants are
placed on the site of the leak. More leaks are discovered over the course of the first week.
Over the whole leak roughly 2,000,000 gallons of dispersants were dropped on the Gulf
of Mexico. It was estimated that a total of 172,000,000 gallons of oil was leaked into the
Gulf of Mexico before the second cap was finally put in place on July 13, 2010.
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On May 2, 2010 from Louisiana to the Florida Panhandle had all banned fishing. This
was because the oil was starting to make landfall. On August 11, 2010 the Feds allowed
fishing off the Florida Panhandle. Currently only 20% of the federal waters remain
closed with more opening daily.
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Appendix 4: Shrimp Tasting Booklet Page
Shrimp tasting Questions
1. Rate the size of the shrimp
Disliked 1—2—3—4—5—6—7—8—9—10 Really Liked
2. Rate the appearance of the shrimp
Bad Color 1—2—3—4—5—6—7—8—9—10 Good Color

3. Rate the smell of the shrimp

Non-Appetizing 1—2—3—4—5—6—7—8—9—10 Appetizing
4. How much did you like the overall taste of the shrimp?
Did not taste Disliked 1—2—3—4—5—6—7—8—9—10 Really Liked
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Appendix 5: Participant Questionnaire
Participant #__________________________________

1. When did you last eat before the experiment?
____________________ Hours ago

2. How hungry were you during the experiment?
Not Hungry 1---2---3---4---5---6---7---8---9 Very Hungry
3.

How many meals per month that you consume consist of seafood?
___________________Meals

4. Of those meals (mentioned in question 3) how many consisted of shrimp?
___________________Meals
5. If you answered zero for question #4, what is the reason that you do not consume
shrimp:
___Too expensive
___Seafood/shrimp allergy
___ Religious reasons
___ Vegetarian/vegan
___Do not like shrimp
___Other____________
6. How do you like your Shrimp? (Circle one from each line)
Headless
Head-on
Tailless
Tail-attached
Deveined
Still has veins
Shelled
Still has shell
7.

How often does your house hold consume
Fresh Caught Shrimp :
Farm Raised Shrimp :

Never Rarely Sometimes
Never Rarely Sometimes
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Often Always
Often Always

8. How much of the Shrimp that you consume/purchase is a product of the United
States?
None Some All
Don’t Know
9.

Are you the primary purchaser of goods in your household?
Yes
No
10. Including yourself what is the size of your household?
___________________________________________
11. Including yourself is anyone in your household allergic to shellfish?
Yes
No
If answered question 10 yes (Circle all that apply)
Myself
Spouse/Significant Other
Child
Other_____________________
12. Before today, where you aware of Country of Origin Labeling?
Yes
No
13. Before today where you aware of difference between Fresh Caught and Farm
Raised Shrimp?
Yes
No
14. How concerned are you with consuming the following:
Shrimp from the Gulf Coast
Not Concerned 1---2---3---4---5---6---7---8---9 Very Concerned
Imported Shrimp
Not Concerned 1---2---3---4---5---6---7---8---9 Very Concerned
Farm Raised Shrimp
Not Concerned 1---2---3---4---5---6---7---8---9 Very Concerned
Fresh Caught Shrimp
Not Concerned 1---2---3---4---5---6---7---8---9 Very Concerned

15. Are you a United States of America Citizen? Yes Other______________
16. What is your Gender?
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Male

Female

17. Do you have children ?
Yes
No
If yes how many are living in your household?_________
What are their Ages?_______________________
18. What is your highest level of education completed?
Less Than High School
High School
Associates’ Degree
Bachelor’s Degree

Some College
Advanced Degree

19. What is your household income? (Circle your income range)
$0-$10,000

$10,001-$20,000

$20,001-$30,000

$30,001-$40,000

$40,001-$50,000 $50,001-$60,000

$60,001-$70,000

$70,001-$80,000

$80,001-$90,000 $90,001-100,000

$100,001-$110,000

$110,001-$120,000

$120,001-$130,000 $130,001-$140,000 $140,001-$150,000

more than $150,000

20. How risky do you view the consumption of the following?
United States Shrimp caught in the Gulf of Mexico
Not Risky 1---2---3---4---5---6---7---8---9 Very Risky
Shrimp that is imported into the United States
Not Risky 1---2---3---4---5---6---7---8---9 Very Risky
Farm Raised Shrimp
Not Risky 1---2---3---4---5---6---7---8---9 Very Risky
Fresh Caught Shrimp
Not Risky 1---2---3---4---5---6---7---8---9 Very Risky
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